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THESIS

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UNDOING FEUDALISM:
A NEW LOOK AT COMMUNAL CONFLICT MEDIATION

by

Randal A. Hetrick II

March 1994

Thesis Advisor:

Dana P. Eyre

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 24 March 1994		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE UNDOING FEUDALISM: A NEW LOOK AT COMMUNAL CONFLICT MEDIATION			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR Randal A. Hetrick II				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE *A	
<p>This paper argues that modern intra-state communal warfare exhibits several unique qualities that distinguish such conflicts, significantly, from the wars in America's historical experience. It demonstrates that identifying the <i>social constructions of reality</i> is a central task for analysts seeking to comprehend the characteristics that define communal conflict. It explains that the <i>objectives</i> for which communal conflicts are waged are often perceived as indivisible, zero sum contests in the most absolute sense and thus differ, fundamentally, from those upon which many inter-state wars of politics are predicated. It illustrates the pernicious but seldom discussed effects of <i>incoherent force structure</i> which provide both the catalyst to escalation and an unavoidable obstacle to negotiations. It concludes that the state-based, implicitly coherent, "rational actor" paradigm for international relations is simply inadequate for the task of analyzing and describing communal conflicts which manifest no such characteristics.</p> <p>The paper proposes a two-fold conceptual strategy for mediation based upon the extent to which a given conflict has escalated, and the level to which its internal force structure has fragmented toward incoherence. The proactive strategy addresses conflicts at an early stage and applies a sociological approach to <i>disarm</i> misperceptions and deconstruct conflict. The reactive strategy requires a forcibly imposed ceasefire followed by extensive sociological, economic, and psychological approaches toward <i>undoing feudalism</i>, that is, toward reunifying fragmented communal society.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Communal Conflict Mediation.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 121	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

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A NEW LOOK AT COMMUNAL CONFLICT MEDIATION

by

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B.A., University of Southern California, 1987

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that modern intra-state communal warfare exhibits several unique qualities that distinguish such conflicts, significantly, from the wars in America's historical experience. It demonstrates that identifying the *social constructions of reality* is a central task for analysts seeking to comprehend the characteristics that define communal conflict. It explains that the *objectives* for which communal conflicts are waged are often perceived as indivisible, zero sum contests in the most absolute sense and thus differ, fundamentally, from those upon which many inter-state wars of politics are predicated. It illustrates the pernicious but seldom discussed effects of *incoherent force structure* which provide both the catalyst to escalation and an unavoidable obstacle to negotiations. It concludes that the state-based, implicitly coherent, "rational actor" paradigm for international relations is simply inadequate for the task of analyzing and describing communal conflicts which manifest no such characteristics.

The paper proposes a two-fold conceptual strategy for mediation based upon the extent to which a given conflict has escalated, and the level to which its internal force structure has fragmented toward incoherence. The proactive strategy addresses conflicts at an early stage and applies a sociological approach to *disarm* misperceptions and deconstruct conflict. The reactive strategy requires a forcibly imposed cease-fire followed by extensive sociological, economic, and psychological approaches toward *undoing feudalism*, that is, toward reunifying fragmented communal society.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

During the process of writing this thesis I received assistance from a number of individuals without whose help I would have suffered considerably more. I wish to thank my Thesis Advisor, Professor Dana Eyre; Professors Gordon McCormick, Maria Moyano, and Roman Laba, of the National Security Affairs Department, for each of their respective contributions to my understanding of political violence; Janet Bogue, John Schmidt, Scott Sullivan, Frederick Fleitz, and others in Washington whose insights in the areas of communal conflict, policy making, and peacekeeping operations significantly enhanced the quality of this paper; Jennifer Duncan, of the Center For Political Violence, for assistance, great and small, in ways too numerous to mention; Tom Latinovich, Mike Westover, and John Binder, the geniuses at Farallon's Technical Support Unit who facilitated all graphics herein and provided technical support *ad nauseam*; and last, though certainly not least, I owe a great debt of thanks to my mentor and unpaid editor, Steve Leonard, without whose patient assistance the stylistic and substantive content of this thesis would be quite different.

RAH

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is intended to help United States policy makers identify and respond to three important yet seldom discussed dynamics of violent communal conflict. It argues that armed conflicts between communal groups, either within states or across state boundaries, manifest certain characteristics that distinguish them, in significant ways, from the major wars in America's political experience. The three key characteristics for analysis are: (1) the major role which *socially constructed reality* plays in defining such conflicts; (2) the perceived *objectives* for which communal conflicts are waged; and (3) the catalyst of *incoherent force* and the effect of fragmented military structure on escalating such conflicts toward total war. These characteristics, in combination, account for the exceptional brutality and intractability of many communal conflagrations and help explain the difficulty western mediators experience in proctoring resolutions of such conflicts.

United States officials devise foreign policy largely on the basis of a state-level, "rational actor" calculus. Policy makers regard international politics as a province of governments who, like the United States, are "utility-maximizers" which conduct themselves according to an instrumental calculus relating defined means to desired ends. While this approach yielded a tidy framework for analysis under the tight bipolar constraints of the cold war, it faces severe limitations in describing a world increasingly characterized by state and national disintegration in which "world powers" play but peripheral roles. For a number of sociological and structural reasons, the "rational bargaining strategy" by which American policy makers approach conflict resolution, and the Western concepts of "just" and "limited" war that underlie this strategy, are of limited utility in generating effective policy responses to the unmitigated carnage endemic in violent communal warfare.

The three main characteristics of violent communal conflict previously mentioned--*socially constructed reality*, *perceived objectives*, and *incoherent force structure*--are treated as separate analytic lenses, each one specifically intended to illuminate a different aspect of any given conflict.

The "social construction-lens" sheds light on the mechanisms by which individuals, through both intra-group and inter-group social activity, create constructions of reality that directly facilitate conflict between communal neighbors. This analysis reveals that, far from being unavoidably compelled to violence by age-old, genetically programmed legacies of visceral hatred, the participants in communal conflicts--wittingly or otherwise--help *create* the very realities within which they find themselves embroiled. That is, although they may well become *victims* as violence escalates, they are also participant *laborers* in the production of their own miseries. Communal conflict is a man-made structure which all adult members of society, to varying degrees of participation, help build.

Perhaps the most difficult notion for American analysts to comprehend, is that individual and group behavior is based largely on *subjective* constructions of reality. Yet this realization reveals why many of the standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy used to mediate instrumental wars of politics simply do not work in influencing the course of communal conflicts. As George Santayana once wrote, "There is nothing so helpless as reason when faced with unreason." Violent communal conflicts are predicated upon subjective constructions of reality that become objectified as essential truths to their psychological adherents. Failure to recognize the existence of unique constructions of reality on each side of a conflict may create a cognitive language barrier between combatants and mediators that simply precludes effectual communication.

The "objective-lens" illustrates another major difference between the inter-group violence of communal conflict and the political violence of interstate conflict. This

analytic perspective demonstrates that inter-national communal conflicts, in contrast to inter-state wars of politics, are often regarded as battles for the cultural or physical survival of the competing groups. Analysts seeking to mediate a specific conflict should ask certain very important questions to discern the essential character of the contest:

- What objectives are at stake?
- Are they *limited*, that is, governed by political calculations and consequently subject to cost-benefit analyses and bargaining behavior?
- Are they *divisible*, that is, can they be divided--equitably or otherwise--between the combatants?
- Or, as is frequently the case in communal warfare, is the objective in question *indivisible*--zero sum competition in the most absolute sense--with "winner-take-all" as the ultimate outcome?
- Finally, is the conflict perceived as a struggle for cultural or physical *survival*, an objective which brooks neither cost-value calculation nor compromise?

Answers to these questions are invaluable in determining the basic complexion of whichever conflict a mediator might face. They allow the analyst to differentiate between non-zero sum games of politics and zero sum struggles for survival. The most important lesson to recall when peering through the objective-lens is not how we--the outside world--regard the objectives in communal conflict, but rather what they--the combatants within it--perceive the stakes to be.

The "force structure-lens" provides the final analytic perspective to this paper's analysis of communal conflict. Incoherent force structure is the essential precondition for fragmented military and paramilitary violence which emerges quickly and builds rapidly in communal conflagrations and, once present, changes fundamentally the complexion of the conflict and the prognosis for resolution. Examination of this dynamic yields important insight into the effects of random violence and crime on the already explosive environment of communal conflict.

Policy makers gazing upon the global field of communal conflicts have essentially two options in selecting strategies for mediation. The first applies to nascent conflicts which have not yet exploded into full-scale communal warfare. The second applies to more advanced conflagrations in which widespread inter-group violence already exists.

In nascent communal conflicts mediators must, proactively, seek to halt the escalation toward zero sum communal competition and, simultaneously, derail the fragmentation to an incoherent force structure. This option requires entree, incentives, and a sociological strategy designed to disarm misperceptions and thereby deconstruct the emerging reality of conflict. It may be accomplished with a minimum of force and a surplus of diplomacy.

The second option deals with advanced communal conflicts manifesting incoherent force structures and zero sum perceptions of reality, in which mediation is considerably more difficult. In such cases, the field of independent "actors" must first be consolidated by a combination of incentives and force. De facto peace having been imposed, intervening forces may then turn to the structural and sociological strategies of organizing government and reconstructing society. This latter option is essentially a process of undoing feudalism, an approach similar in concept to those which successfully reunited the feudal societies of Europe and Japan.

This thesis melds several diverse areas of research within its coherent "conceptual-lens" perspective. The premise is that the dynamics of communal conflict can be elucidated more effectively from a "macro," multi-disciplinary viewpoint than from several "micro" perspectives viewed individually. From a better understanding of the dynamics should flow better strategies for mediation.

The methodology used here adopts a unique, sociological approach to the analysis and treatment of violent intra-state communal conflict. It endeavors to blend precepts of sociology, psychology, ethnology, and conflict resolution theory into a cogent aid to assist

in understanding and treating these complex inter-*national* disputes. It is, in great measure, a sociological examination of the internal dynamics of communal warfare.

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is intended to help United States policy makers identify, understand and respond to three important yet seldom discussed dynamics of violent communal conflict.¹ It argues that armed conflicts between communal groups, either within states or across state boundaries, manifest certain characteristics that distinguish them, in significant ways, from the major wars in America's political experience. The three key characteristics for analysis are: (1) the major role which *socially constructed reality* plays in defining such conflicts; (2) the perceived *objectives* for which communal conflicts are waged; and (3) the catalyst of *incoherent force* and the effect of fragmented military structure on escalating such conflicts toward total war. These characteristics, in combination, account for the exceptional brutality and intractability of many communal conflagrations and help explain the difficulty western mediators experience in proctoring resolutions of such conflicts.

A basic assumption of this paper is that American policy makers are intrinsically, though not insurmountably, disadvantaged in grappling with issues of ethnic and religious warfare. This is true not because the country is void of social strife, but rather because such violence is anathematic to the broader conceptual "melting-pot" on which American socialization is modeled. Americans, raised on ideals of representative democracy, generally embrace the primacy of non-violent compromise in resolving social conflict. Through the continual, rational bargaining process of America's political system, social

¹The term "communal" is used here to connote inter-group conflicts arising between social groups that reside within a shared geographic region. The perceived "root of conflict" (i.e. ethnicity, religion, et al.) is not of paramount importance to this definition. What is required is for an "us" versus "them" dichotomy to have been constructed between parties in a finite geographic region, or *homeland*, for communal conflict to arise. Thus, the term "communal" will describe a variety of *identity based conflicts* be they ethnic, religious, sub-ethnic, a combination of each, or even, in some cases, political in origin.

cleavages are gradually but inexorably abraded, thereby drawing nearer the ideal of strong *state* socialization beneath which *national* identities may coexist peacefully.² This author contends, however, that the precepts governing America's social policies at home often form inappropriate foreign policy paradigms for dealing with conflicts whose participants--for a variety of reasons--do not, or cannot, share a similar construct of reality.

United States officials devise foreign policy largely on the basis of a state-level, "rational actor" calculus. Policy makers regard international politics as a province of governments who, like the United States, are "utility-maximizers" which conduct themselves according to an instrumental calculus relating defined means to desired ends.³ While this approach yielded a tidy framework for analysis under the tight bipolar constraints of the cold war, it faces severe limitations in describing a world increasingly characterized by state and national disintegration in which "world powers" play but peripheral roles.

²Throughout this paper, the term *nation* will refer to the essentially psychological bond which, as Walker Connor eloquently describes, "joins a people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all other people in a most vital way." See Walker Connor, "A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a ...," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1978): 379. This usage contrasts with the common--albeit mistaken--usage of *nation* as a synonym for *state*, a term that properly denotes a particular political subdivision of the globe.

³This paper assumes that the "rational actor" model of international relations--interstate conflict as means-ends activity--has long provided the theoretic framework for American foreign policy. This assumption is based on a wide body of literature supporting this position. For sympathetic views see Russel Weigley, *The American Way of War* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1973); Larry Cable, *Conflict of Myths* (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1986); Carl Builder, *The Masks of War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1989); Andrew F. Krepenovich, *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986); Dennis Drew and Donald Snow, *Making Strategy* (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Univ. Press, 1988). For specific discussions of the rational actor/utility maximizer paradigm see Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1981).

Therefore, a second objective of this paper will be to illustrate some significant flaws inherent within the dominant paradigms that currently guide U.S. foreign policy. For a number of sociological and structural reasons, the "rational bargaining strategy" by which the United States approaches conflict resolution, and the Western concepts of "just" and "limited" war that underlie this strategy, are of limited utility in generating effective policy responses to the unmitigated carnage endemic of violent communal warfare. Two purely conceptual alternative strategies will be discussed by which either to: (1) preempt the escalation of violence in increasingly divided societies, or (2) undo the feudal structure of inter-clan warfare which often arises in tandem with the widespread outbreak of communal violence, and undo the sinister side-effects that accompany it.

A. METHODOLOGY

This thesis melds several diverse areas of research into a coherent "conceptual-lens" perspective. The premise is that the dynamics of communal conflict can be elucidated more effectively from a "macro," multi-disciplinary viewpoint than from several "micro" perspectives viewed individually. From a better understanding of the dynamics should flow better strategies for mediation.

The methodology used here adopts a unique, sociological approach to the analysis and treatment of violent intra-state communal conflict. It endeavors to blend precepts of sociology, psychology, ethnology, and conflict resolution theory into a cogent aid to assist in understanding and treating these complex *inter-national* disputes.⁴ It is, in great measure, a sociological examination of the internal dynamics of communal warfare.

⁴Additionally, the paper's analytic framework endeavors to address a number of specific areas for useful research suggested by U.S. officials during interviews conducted at the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Department of Defense during December 1993, Washington, D.C.

The three main characteristics of violent communal conflict previously mentioned--*socially constructed reality*, *perceived objectives*, and *incoherent force structure*--will be treated as separate analytic lenses, each one specifically intended to illuminate a different aspect of any given conflict.

Chapter II illustrates, first, the mechanisms of individual and group socialization by which a society's key beliefs are formed and altered; and, second, the vital role which the *social constructions of reality* play in defining the essential course and character of every violent communal conflict.

Chapter III reveals a key difference between the inter-group violence of communal conflict and the political violence of interstate conflict: the essential *objectives* over which these wars are waged. The discussion will show that inter-national communal conflicts, in contrast to inter-state political warfare, are often regarded as battles for the cultural or physical survival of the combatants.

Chapter IV analyzes the unique escalation dynamic of *incoherent force structure* and illustrates the effects of random violence and crime on the already explosive environment of communal conflict.

Finally, Chapter V discusses some of the blatant limitations of America's dominant paradigm for conflict analysis--the "Rational Actor" model--and reviews the various policy implications that flow from the preceding sociological analysis of violent communal warfare.

II. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION-LENS

This chapter establishes the central conceptual framework around which the subsequent chapters of this thesis will revolve. It lays the groundwork for a sociological exploration of the *social constructions of reality*, and offers an introduction to the myriad ways in which such constructions create and circumscribe communal conflict. Such analysis is essential not only to understanding the *whys* and *hows* of identity based conflicts, but also to recognizing opportunities and limitations for those standing outside a conflict, looking in.

The "social construction-lens" sheds light on the mechanisms by which individuals, through both intra-group and inter-group social activity, create constructions of reality that directly facilitate conflict between communal neighbors. This analysis reveals that, far from being unavoidably compelled to violence by age-old, genetically programmed legacies of visceral hatred, the participants in communal conflicts--wittingly or otherwise--help *create* the very realities within which they find themselves embroiled. That is, although they may well become *victims* as violence escalates, they are also participant *laborers* in the production of their own miseries. Communal conflict is a man-made construction which all adult members of society, to varying degrees of participation, help build.

A. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS

Perhaps because the nature of social construction theory is somewhat abstract, it is seldom discussed as a tool for analysts and policy makers attempting to forge policy responses to the world's conflicts. This is unfortunate, for the "construction-lens" yields valuable insights not only on the motives of the specific national and sub-national "actors" in question, but also into the basic assumptions upon which U.S. policy is itself predicated.

1. Social Construction: American Style

To illustrate the utility of a sociological approach to policy analysis, it is instructive to briefly examine one of the key assumptions upon which American policies are based. This approach is not intended as a critique of U.S. policy, but rather as an illustration of a common socially constructed fact in action. The construction-lens reveals that some of the core tenets of U.S. diplomacy, taken for granted as *facts* by the American public, are somewhat less solid than might be expected. By examining the notion of America's "national interest," we gain insight into the ways in which constructed realities come to effect policy.

It is a *commonsense* notion that America's political leadership pursues instrumental foreign policy options perceived to be in support of the "national interest." However, exactly what this nebulous phrase connotes is in no way clear--either to elected politicians or to the constituents they serve. Apart from vague but generally acceptable definitions such as "those things that benefit America's economy and safeguard her national security," one would have little luck in reaching broad consensus on what specifically comprises the "national interest."⁵

In his classic work elucidating the "Rational Actor" model of international relations (war as an expected-utility problem), Bruce Bueno de Mesquita reveals the

⁵This topic provides the substance of an excellent, highly provocative course (NS 4200) entitled "Seminar in the National Interest," given by Professor Frank Teti of the National Security Affairs Department, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. The eleven-week course examines the epistemological foundations--predicated upon Americans' social constructions of reality--upon which any meaningful conception of the "national interest" rests. Among the most valuable lessons of this course is that the national interest is, in fact, an intangible, highly subjective psychological construction that *exists* as reality only so long as Americans collectively believe that it *exists*. Moreover, it is a notion which is seldom defined in exactly the same way by different people. That is, as individual Americans differ, so do their conceptions of *the national interest*. No two versions are exactly alike.

virtual impossibility of ascertaining, or acting on the basis of *the national interest* in a pluralistic society:

We may identify national policies, but there is no reason to expect those policies to be related to "the will of the people" or to "the public good" when they result from collectively made decisions. Decision-making rules, from unanimity to dictatorship, may permit the advice of any number of people to influence public policy, but once consent is required from more than one and fewer than all, the danger is great that decisions on controversial questions will be unrepresentative of anyone's interest. Once decision making is bureaucratized, the quest for acceptable compromises increases the likelihood that *there will be little or no congruence between national policies and the individual intentions or purposes in that society, offering even less reason to believe that there is anything resembling the national interest.*⁶ (Emphasis added.)

Bueno de Mesquita thus postulates that the results of any given collectively made decision may represent the desires of a minority, a single individual, or no one at all. He accepts the conclusion of "Arrow's Paradox"—a hypothesis offered by Nobel Prize-winning economist Kenneth Arrow—that many social choices may, indeed, represent the interests of no one or of anyone.⁷ Explained this way, it seems almost incomprehensible that America's elected representatives could be successful in identifying and acting consistently in accordance with the *national interest* of the country as, incidentally, most purport to do.

This apparent conundrum has significant implications for those charged with formulating U.S. foreign policy. How, for instance, can policies ostensibly rooted in America's "national interest" be formulated when no clear identification of such a concept exists? There is no single answer to this question. Policy makers walk on a platform of broadly constructed political and social realities. This platform provides latitudinal boundaries within which specific issues are determined by democratic consensus.

⁶See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1981): 12-13.

⁷*Ibid.*, 13.

While a detailed analysis of America's interests is far beyond the scope and subject of this paper, the aforementioned--albeit unanswered--question illustrates that some of the notions which Americans subconsciously take for granted as "fact," are in reality, not *facts* at all. Rather they are broadly associated concepts which, through the reciprocal process of social construction, become reinforced as *truth* in the minds of most citizens. Commonsense *truths* and everyday *facts* become inseparable as *reality*. Citizens, acting in concert at the ballot box, transfer such "truths" to the minds of elected officials who, in turn, formulate policies based upon "facts" which--as we recall--are not, objectively, facts at all. They are merely constructions of reality that satisfy most of the needs of American society.

Ask most Americans if it is in the "national interest" to save starving people and they will answer in the affirmative. Ask *which* interests? and one receives, as often as not, shrugs of uncertainty. This paradox is of enormous importance to the country's political leadership. It is incumbent upon policy makers, and the analysts who advise them, to continually reevaluate the "taken for granted assumptions" (e.g. constructions of reality) upon which American foreign policies are founded.⁸

⁸In their path-breaking book on the sociology of knowledge entitled, *The Social Construction of Reality* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann argue that a socially constructed *concept* undergoes the transformation to *fact* when society collectively ceases to examine its verity on a continual basis but rather "takes for granted" the concept as an objective truth. Berger and Luckmann write, "The reality of everyday life is taken for granted as reality. It does not require additional verification over and beyond its simple presence. It is simply *there*, as self-evident and compelling facticity. I *know* that it is real." (23.) This is not to argue that the world is void of objective facts (i.e. starvation, tidal waves, et al.). Starvation and tidal waves, for instance, exist whether or not humans in society collectively acknowledge them as such. Social construction of fact occurs in the interpretation of such physical realities. The *fact* that starvation is *tragic*, or that tidal waves are *fearsome*, is where the socially constructed reality may be found.

Moving back to the utility of a *social construction perspective* in analysis and mediation of communal conflict, one now sees that the conceptual "lens" may be peered through from either direction. It may be used either to examine the motives of combatants within a specific conflict, or to scrutinize the assumptions underlying American policy initiatives designed to effect that conflict.

In the area of communal conflict mediation, U.S. doctrine is clearly in the developmental stage; that is, the constructed reality of *America-As-Mediator* in such conflicts is not yet complete. Standard operating procedures (SOP) do not yet exist to provide well-tested guidance to the Clinton Administration on such matters. Hence, Ross Perot's rueful characterization of the administration--with respect to Bosnia--as "flying blind without instruments," is, in some ways, accurate.⁹ The policy construction process is presently underway, however, and each "success" or "failure" reveals yet another missing piece of the horizon to help the pilot chart a more coherent course.

Two final insights for analysis are provided by utilizing the social construction perspective. First, it reveals that the constructions of reality which define the character of communal conflicts are inherently dynamic; that is, perceptions of "present reality" change substantially as a function of time and circumstance. The process facilitating such change will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Second, the "construction-lens" reveals that fundamentally different--indeed reciprocal--perceptions of reality may exist simultaneously between the respective parties in conflict, as well as between mediators attempting to forge lasting peace. As Berger and Luckmann explain, such differences in perceived "realities"--although commonly ignored in everyday life--should be of great interest both to the sociologist and to the analyst of communal conflict:

⁹See Howard Fineman, "Perot: Rattling the White House," *Newsweek* 10 May 1993: 34.

One could say that the sociological understanding of "reality" and "knowledge" falls somewhere in the middle between that of the man in the street and that of the philosopher. The man in the street does not ordinarily trouble himself about what is "real" to him and about what he "knows" unless he is stopped short by some sort of problem. He takes his "reality" and his "knowledge" for granted. The sociologist [like the conflict analyst] cannot do this, if only because of his systematic awareness of the fact that men in the street take quite different "realities" for granted as between one society and another. The sociologist is forced by the very logic of his discipline to ask, if nothing else, whether the difference between the two "realities" may not be understood in relation to various differences between the two societies.¹⁰

Because one's perception of the objectives in conflict plays the defining role in articulating strategy and dictating tactics, discrepant perceptions portend equally discrepant patterns of behavior and motivations for action. Mediators should attempt to ascertain such differences and adapt approaches accordingly.

B. INTRODUCTION TO A PERSPECTIVE¹¹

Unlike many other sociological theories attempting to explain human behavior, the social construction perspective argues that individuals are functional actors in shaping their own realities.¹² Rather than accepting the argument that individual behavior is merely a response to larger social forces, *social constructionists* assert that each individual human plays a significant role in creating and influencing reality as it is perceived by his immediate social group. The collective perceptions of that group, in turn, influence the broader interpretations of reality at the societal level, and so on. Hence, at the lowest

¹⁰Berger and Luckmann, 2.

¹¹Much of this section is based directly upon the framework provided by Dana P. Eyre, David R. Segal, and Mady Wechsler Segal in "The Social Construction of Peacekeeping," in Segal and Segal, *Peacekeepers And Their Wives* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993): 42-55.

¹²Eyre, et al., provide a concise overview of the *functionalist* and *conflict* perspectives, two alternative views of human behavior, citing the basic precepts of each as well as the significant protagonists of both views. See *ibid.*, 44.

level of analysis, individuals matter in what *is*, or *is not*, perceived as reality. As Eyre, et al., write:

The label social constructionism, although awkward, thus emphasizes a central insight into the basic nature of society. Human beings are not merely acted on by disembodied social facts or distant social forces, but rather are actors, constantly shaping and creating their own worlds in and through interaction with other individuals.¹³

This concept of the individual's role in shaping (e.g. constructing) reality will become particularly significant later, when this paper turns to the mechanisms by which mediators may hope to *deconstruct* or *remodel* existing realities and thereby undo violent communal conflicts.

Although the social construction perspective focuses on individual action, it does not ignore the power of society in shaping behavior. To the contrary, it places enormous importance on the reciprocal reinforcement dynamic between the individual and other members within his group, and within broader society in general. To proceed upward in one's level of analysis, however, it is essential to identify and clearly recognize the seminal function of the individual in shaping society's most basic conceptions of reality. As Eyre, et al., explain, "Families, classes, ethnic groups, businesses, churches, armies, and even nations are, at their roots, human creations that do not exist independently of individual social behavior. We create these collectivities and the rules we live by, and we daily recreate them through our behavior. That these collectivities, once created, in turn shape our lives does not reduce the reality of their constructed nature."¹⁴ Hence any investigation into the nature of group perceptions and collective behavior should begin by examining the conceptions of reality held by the *individuals* that comprise that group.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

Another valuable insight yielded by the social construction perspective is a thorough debunking of genetic or biological sociology. That is, explanations of human behavior as preprogrammed by genetics become transparent when viewed through the social construction-lens. For example, the behavior and character of an infant removed from his "warrior tribe" at birth and raised by a pair of Oxford professors will, as an adult, far more closely resemble Winston Churchill than Shaka Zulu. This basic "socialization" argument is hardly controversial, and yet one regularly reads careless references, for instance, to the "warrior blood" of the Balkan Slavs as justification for the ongoing carnage in Bosnia.¹⁵ Indeed, despite the taken-for-granted validity of socialization as the leading factor in human behavior, substantial portions of the public and of the government body, writ large, seem to prefer regarding atavistic behavior as a genetic product of specific races. Such ill-considered arguments are revealed as hollow when individual beliefs are analyzed and their sources traced immediately to social interaction with others.

Human behavior is shaped primarily by the *meanings* and *beliefs* that individuals use to understand a situation. The compulsion to "make sense" of one's world is, perhaps, intrinsic to human nature. In that sense, human actions are essentially a series of ongoing stimulus-response activities in which individuals formulate beliefs as a way of ordering and understanding their surroundings. Such beliefs give meaning to life's everyday activities and, over time, become codified as *reality*.

Yet, despite the routinized nature of the reality construction process, it is clear that *meaning* and *belief* are not static throughout life but, to the contrary, are ever-changing. Rather than assuming fixed--ergo unchangeable--configurations, meanings and beliefs are dynamic; that is, they are continually reconstructed through ongoing interactions with

¹⁵But one of innumerable examples of this point is found in Robert D. Kaplan's colorfully written but historically and analytically careless work entitled *Balkan Ghosts* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

one's environment. This concept--*the malleability of belief*--is enormously important in revealing opportunities for a sociological approach to conflict mediation.¹⁶

If one accepts the hypothesis that individual behavior is predicated upon meaning and belief, then it follows that coordinated action at the group level is only possible because of *shared meaning* between its members. Thus, to understand a particular individual's or group's behavior, much less to have any hope of modifying such behavior, we must approach the situation from the standpoint of the actors within it.

Eyre, et al., argue that to comprehend the conduct of any group in a given situation, the analyst must "develop an understanding of the 'commonsense meanings'--the internal experiences--carried by the actors involved in [that particular] situation." As a helpful conceptual tool for accomplishing this task, they suggest that the sociologist assume an "analytical assumption of meaninglessness."¹⁷ Such an assumption essentially views the world as objectively devoid of meaning. Hence, only through a process of individual and mutual interaction do humans assign meaning to their daily routines and surroundings.

This *analytic assumption of meaninglessness* is of great assistance to the sociologist endeavoring to understand and explain the motives to group behavior. It simplifies the analyst's task by focusing his attention directly on the processes through which a group's commonsense shared meanings--the foundation upon which all coordinated social action depends--are constructed and maintained. Analysis at this level yields what may be the central insight offered by the social construction perspective: that *meaning and belief--hence, reality--is constructed reciprocally*. Eyre, et al., illuminate this reciprocal relationship by discussing one of the basic dynamics of American etiquette:

¹⁶This is not to imply that belief systems are entirely malleable and *easy* to change, but rather that individual beliefs are relatively more malleable than might be consciously acknowledged.

¹⁷Eyre, et al., 45.

To illustrate [the reciprocal construction dynamic] at a basic level, rules defining whether one should rest one's hands on the dinner table or in the lap while not eating during a meal have meaning (they symbolize refinement or the lack thereof), not because of the inherent nature of either option, but because of a common constructed interpretation of the act. Our understandings are shaped at an early age. Our behavior reproduces those understandings, and in turn, it shapes the behavior of others...*Arguments of social constructionism therefore, have the advantage of directing our attention toward both the way in which meaning guides behavior, and the process through which meaning is constructed.*¹⁸ (Emphasis added.)

The social construction perspective thus sheds light on the manner in which people attempt to "make sense" of their universe, and the reciprocal effect which their findings (manifest as meaning, knowledge, and beliefs) have on shaping individual and group behavior.

This comprehension illustrates well the profound interaction between the communal environment in which one lives and the essential meaning one's world assumes. The seldom considered but oft cited maxim, "one is a product of one's environment," is thus true to the extent that one's knowledge *about* the social world is, in many ways, a direct product *of* that world. As Eyre, et al., summarize nicely, "Major parts of what we experience as 'real' are, in fact, produced through social interaction. This includes our sense of who we are: our sense of self."¹⁹ Hence the analyst attempting to understand a communal group's perceptions of reality and ascertain the grounding upon which its actions are based must first be familiar with the basic mechanisms by which collective meaning is acquired.

¹⁸Ibid., 45-6. The authors assert that the reciprocal relationship between individual and group in the process of constructing and reinforcing meaning is the central insight of social constructionism. They argue that, "...language, social institutions, and culture all have common meaning because we, collectively, act as if they have common meaning." (45.)

¹⁹Ibid., 46.

1. The Socialization Process

Although a comprehensive sociological discussion of the construction of "human society" is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief introduction to some of the basic aspects of the socialization process is useful to analysts employing the construction-lens to better understand communal conflict. This process is, as discussed earlier, a reciprocal activity whereby individuals' beliefs and behavior are effected by society even as society is defined by the individual members within it. And while many of one's most basic constructions of reality are established at an early age (primary socialization), the ongoing process of redefining meaning occurs throughout life (secondary socialization), yielding re-constructions of reality with no less power or significance than those borne of childhood.²⁰

Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language defines the verb to *socialize* as, "to make social; make fit for life in companionship with others."²¹ This concise definition adequately summarizes the ultimate objective of the process of human socialization, a task assumed by communal groups of all regions, in every country of the world. And yet, as discussed earlier, the process is not merely a one-way activity of groups making individuals *fit for life in companionship with others*. It is also the forum in which individuals reciprocally participate in the creation of their own realities, accepting some--which they reinforce by becoming part--and refusing others--which they weaken by rejecting. Through this reciprocal socialization process individuals

²⁰For an examination of the respective roles which primary and secondary socialization play in *internalizing reality*, and a discussion of the various mechanisms by which each is accomplished, see Berger and Luckmann, 129-147.

²¹*Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language* (New York: Portland House, 1989): 1351.

shape the characteristics of institutions and groups of which they become part, even as they, themselves, are defined by those very groups and institutions.

While it is clear that socialization plays a key role in creating beliefs and shaping reality, it is equally clear that the process is ongoing throughout one's life. That is, while notions of primary versus secondary socialization are theoretically interesting, there is little evidence to indicate that the lessons learned in childhood (i.e. keep hands off table; respect one's elders; the Golden Rule; etc.) are any more powerful or enduring than those adopted later in life (i.e. I am a military officer; avoid dark alleys at night; or, for neo-Nazis, Jews are the scourge of the earth; etc.). Hence socialization is an ongoing process in which the continual construction and reconstruction of belief and reality is an integral part.

To summarize, socialization is a continual process whereby individuals make sense of the social and physical worlds, and society makes sense of them. Members construct meanings and assume social roles even as their beliefs and behavior are being defined by the very roles which they adopt. Commonly held beliefs among group members provide coherence: helping order realities, dictating everyday behavior, and providing meaning in life's otherwise meaningless environment. The socialization process thus influences the beliefs which define individual and group behavior, and continues from cradle to grave.

C. REMODELING REALITY

As discussed earlier, widely held meanings and beliefs yield essential guidance for the conduct of daily life, and provide substantive grist to the social constructions of reality. Through simple routine, beliefs left unchallenged by developments in the physical or social

world which they cannot explain may become *objectified* as social institutions over time.²² Such *institutions* are, essentially, social patterns based on taken-for-granted facts, which circumscribe appropriate behavior in everyday life. If, however, society becomes confronted by a social or physical condition which the standing institutions fail to satisfy, its members are compelled to develop a better understanding of the situation. This forces a reevaluation of those taken-for-granted realities which have been found insufficient to the task at hand. In such instances, the stage is set for a remodeling of existing institutions; that is, for the reconstruction of reality.

The *remodeling* process occurs when the existing "recipes for social interaction" fail to bring about a satisfactory resolution to a given social situation.²³ When faced with new, uncertain or intimidating ambiguities in life, humans seek rationalization. This rationalization process occurs first, by investigating the emergent puzzle; and, second, by offering accounts and explanations which provide newly constructed meaning to help understand the situation. Remodeling is an inherently social activity in which, through mutual interaction, nascent concepts become reinforced as the "answers" to society's emergent "questions." Eyre, et al., summarize the mechanisms by which this task is regularly accomplished in one's daily life:

Through discussion, debate, and interaction, an emergent meaning is constructed in problematic situations. We act in situations, develop them, and change them, constantly constructing or reevaluating meaning for the emergent situation through our interaction with others. These socially constructed meanings help coordinate interactions, but they are volatile because the situations themselves change. *As the situation changes, meaning is reconstructed.*²⁴ (Emphasis added.)

²²For a far more detailed treatment of *society as objective reality* than is provided here, as well as a discussion of the mechanisms by which social institutions are codified, see Berger and Luckmann, 47-92.

²³Eyre, et al., 49.

²⁴Ibid.

Understanding both the vehicles and implications of the remodeling process is essential for analysts of communal conflict.

Indeed, it is the manipulation of this process--often by political elites attempting to build constituent support--which leads to the rise of intergroup animosity. Via a number of mechanisms, communal reality becomes reconstructed in the form of inter-group hostility, thereby unleashing conflict where it may not have previously existed.

1. Belief System Alteration

As part of our further discussion of the reality remodeling process, it is instructive to briefly examine the concept of belief system alteration. In his theoretical treatise entitled, *The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing*, Issac Levi provides an excellent introduction to some of the existing theories on belief alteration.²⁵ Levi argues that the process of changing constructed beliefs occurs--and is justified by the participants--in one of two essential ways. Cognitive change is effected either by (1) expansion, or (2) contraction, of the existing inventory of beliefs. One does not--either at the individual or group level--argues Levi, simply replace a system of beliefs outright. This notion should be of significant interest to analysts of communal conflict, for it illustrates the incremental nature of the reality remodeling process.

In the first of Levi's cognitive alteration mechanisms, the "expansion" option, the existing inventory is altered by addition of new beliefs. Such beliefs become justified for inclusion when they are widely found to provide satisfactory, consistent meaning to emergent social puzzles. Once a substantial portion of the group's population accepts the validity of such a concept, the previously discussed process of social construction begins to codify its position within the existing structure of reality. The longer such an "answer"

²⁵Issac Levi, *The Fixation of Belief and Its Undoing* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991).

succeeds in rationalizing the previously problematic puzzle, the more deeply ingrained it becomes in the belief system of both individual and group. A society's collective belief system is thus expanded by the addition of new concepts which, over time, have proven their worth by providing meaning to new, ever-emerging social realities.

Levi's second method for belief system alteration is the "contraction" option. This occurs when the validity of a previously settled "assumption" becomes seriously questioned by a significant portion of society. Members cease being certain of an assumption either when its ability to satisfy a long-standing requirement falters, or when a newly discovered concept--perhaps one added to the system through the expansion process mentioned earlier--better satisfies the cognitive requirement, thereby marking the assumption in question as obsolete.

Perhaps because of the discomfort humans encounter in the face of uncertainty, there is an inherent reluctance to forsake erstwhile settled assumptions outright. This is particularly true when no clearly superior, comprehensive alternative is available. The natural preference is to simply continue to expand a belief system by addition.

Contractions are avoided so long as the increasingly antiquated assumptions in question maintain even a modicum of relevance. The reluctance to eschew standing convictions varies from person to person according circumstance, and thus accounts for basic differences in perceived reality--even between members of the same group. This realization helps to explain extant *individuality* within even the most rigidly structured societies.

Generally speaking, it is far easier for the members of a society to accept new beliefs (expand) than to erase old ones (contract). This helps explain the recalcitrance of long-standing ethnic or religious stereotypes as justification for prejudice between social groups in mixed communal societies. Despite emerging evidence of an "other" group's social worth--even, in many cases, in spite of significant, tangible contributions to the

universal betterment of society--competing group members may choose to maintain preexisting prejudices within their individual belief systems.

a. The "Phantom Limb" Hypothesis

This concept is explained well in Lawrence Leshan's provocative investigation into the psychological foundations of violent conflict entitled, *The Psychology of War*. Leshan effectively illustrates this natural reluctance to alter one's belief system by contraction through the medium of his "Phantom Limb" hypothesis of human psychology. He argues that belief system maintenance occurs largely as a product of its own inertia.²⁶ That is, according to Leshan, people will continue to believe a notion that was once true simply because it has not been absolutely proven to be untrue. This insight is useful in illustrating the potential for latent beliefs, perhaps even those long dormant, to be maintained within the collective psyche of a segment of society unless specifically proven to be obsolete and consciously removed. This notion will be important in the discussion, later in this chapter, of the role of history as a ready resource pool for the construction of communal conflict.

The continued existence of significant racial stereotypes in the United States, despite the long standing "melting pot" conception of American socialization, provides one such example of the "Phantom Limb" hypothesis in action. Many elder, white Americans--socialized with the belief of racial supremacy, an assumption codified as reality by segregation and other such institutions--refuse to relinquish anachronistic stereotypes regarding minority populations. This avoidance of belief system contraction is significant because such beliefs may be transferred, at least in part, to succeeding

²⁶See Lawrence Leshan, *The Psychology of War* (Chicago: Noble Press, Inc., 1993): 10.

generations of family members and thereby remain within the social constructions of reality long after their problem-solving utility has gone.

The concepts of Levi and Leshan on belief system alteration are of enormous significance to analysts of communal conflict. They reinforce the notion that the process of constructing animosity between competing social groups is a gradual one, though varying in speed and method according to circumstance. This realization suggests the existence of a hypothetical *window of opportunity* for intervention during which the process of belief system alteration--hence, the remodeling of reality--might be derailed, and the looming conflict de-escalated with minimal bloodshed.

2. Shifting Realities

A second theoretical concept useful to understanding the reconstruction process is the notion of fluctuating *perspectives* of reality. The act of shifting the perspective from which one discerns one's immediate reality is a common occurrence in daily life. The shift in reality experienced during a transition from consciousness to day dream, provides one example. Becoming immersed in the plot of an action movie provides another such example. The shift requires the viewer to assume a fundamentally different perspective of reality from that which he occupied, for instance, during the drive to the theater. This concept of short term shifts in perceived reality applies equally well at both the group and, indeed, national levels as well.

Such "shifts" in perspective are significant in defining one's behavior in everyday life. They involve undergoing a temporary transition from the dispassionate reality bounding one's mundane daily tasks, to a more highly charged reality in response to a newly perceived emergency of some kind. In such a scenario one's perspective of reality--and, concomitantly, one's behavior--changes significantly, but temporarily, in reaction to perceived changes or threats in the surrounding social environment.

Again, Lawrence Leshan provides a useful framework for analysis of this important psychological phenomenon. Leshan contrasts the conceptual perspectives of *everyday reality* and *special reality*, which he terms sensory and mythic, respectively. Sensory reality essentially reflects the reality of one's immediate physical world; that is, the truly objective state of things as they might appear to a disinterested observer. The mythic perspective, by contrast, reflects a social construction borne of passionate human interaction. Mythic reality incorporates the prejudices, fears, and myths embodied in one's social and historical resource pool which combine to form a different reality entirely from that of the sensory perception. Individual and group behavior thus varies significantly depending on which perspective of reality one assumes at any given time.

Leshan asserts that this shift occurs, in moderate degrees, as a regular feature of daily life. Noted behaviorist Eric Ericson believed that only through keen awareness and conscious psychological effort does man remain in either frame of reality for any significant length of time.²⁷ Largely through reciprocal interaction with others, who seldom share exactly the same perspective at the exactly the same time, individuals move back and forth between sensory and mythic perspectives, generally without even noticing the transition.

An exception to this pattern of socially imposed "sanity checks" occurs when an emergency of some significance is perceived simultaneously, and regarded as threatening by a significant sector of the populace. In such an instance, sensory reality may be suspended simultaneously across a broad spectrum of effected society. This creates a potentially dangerous situation in which an entire social group assumes a universal perception of reality in the mythic perspective. According to Leshan, the most common and comprehensive emergency eliciting such a response, is war.

²⁷Cited in *ibid.*, 40.

The great danger posed by the mythic perception of reality at a group-wide level is thus that the normal system of checks and balances between members becomes deactivated. That is, critical thought becomes collectively suspended as the group "reacts" rather than "thinks." This situation is problematic because, with all members of a group interpreting reality from a similar, absolute perspective, it becomes virtually impossible to extricate themselves from a rapidly escalating conflict. Leshan writes,

It is only in the sensory reality that one can learn from experience or from history. In the mythic reality, the rules are so firmly set that little learning occurs. We follow our concepts of "what is," rather than examine and learn from what is happening.²⁸

Indeed, once a shift to mythic perspective comes to characterize a significant portion of the group's psyche, escalation of hostilities becomes far easier. Hence Leshan's assertion that, "All wars are brought about--and bring about--a shift from the sensory reality evaluation system to that of the mythic reality."²⁹ Within such a collective perspective, the reciprocal reinforcement dynamic--an integral part of the social reconstruction of reality, as discussed earlier--is far more rapidly and powerfully facilitated.

Contrasting the differing perceptions of reality in peacetime and wartime yields a useful illustration of the dichotomous relationship between the sensory and mythic perspectives. One of the key indicators of such a transition is the shift from limited or varying interpretations of reality to absolute perspectives, etched in black and white. Another indicator is the reorientation of the language people use to describe opposing groups. In Table 1, Leshan elucidates some of prevalent perceptual differences between the socially constructed realities of war and peace:

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., 63.

Peacetime	Wartime
<p>1. Good and Evil have many shades of gray. Many groups with different ideas and opinions are legitimate. Their opinions, and things in general, are relatively good or bad, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, stupid or intelligent.</p>	<p>Good and Evil are reduced to Us and Them. There are no innocent bystanders; there are only those for or those against us. The crucial issues of the world are divided into black and white. Opinions on these matters are absolutely right or absolutely wrong.</p>
<p>2. Now is pretty much like other times. There are more of some things, less of others, but the differences are quantitative.</p>	<p>Now is Special, qualitatively different from all other times. Everything is cast in the balance; whoever wins now wins forever. It is the time of the final battle between good and evil--of Armageddon, of Ragnarok, of The War to End All Wars.</p>
<p>3. The great forces of nature, such as God or human evolution, are not particularly involved in our disputes.</p>	<p>"Gott Mit Uns," "Manifest Destiny," "Dieu et mon Droit," "History fights on our side," and other such slogans indicate our belief that the great motivating forces of the cosmos are for Us.</p>
<p>4. When this present period is over, things will go on pretty much as they have in the past.</p>	<p>When this war is over, everything will be vastly different. If we win, it will be much better; if we lose, terribly worse. The world will be deeply changed by what we do here. Winning or losing will change the shape of the future.</p>

Table 1: Shifting Perspectives of Reality in War and Peace³⁰

³⁰Ibid., 35.

Leshan argues that such catastrophes as Hiroshima and Dresden would not have been possible had the men in power been formulating strategy from a sensory rather than mythic perspective of reality.

Hence the concept of temporal shifts in one's perspective of reality, from sensory to mythic, even as it occurs beneath the greater rubric of a society's more enduring constructions of reality, is of significant interest to the analyst of communal conflict. It helps to explain the phenomenon--referred to in lay terminology as "mob mentality"--in which groups of otherwise reasonable individuals join suddenly together to commit seemingly inexplicable, indiscriminate acts of violence against others. Such an event, generally short lived and followed quickly by atomization of the group's members, is facilitated in part by a temporary, collective shift in perception to the mythic perspective of reality.

Transitions to mythic reality vary widely in scope and duration, and manifest equally discrepant effects on group behavior. A lynching, for instance, might exemplify a short-term shift of extremely limited scope. World war, by contrast, represents a more enduring transition of obviously enormous scope and consequence. In either case, it is within such a collectively mythic perspective that the reciprocal reinforcement dynamic of social construction may be most effectively manipulated by political pragmatists. This may facilitate the onset of widespread vilification of communal opponents within a fundamentally remodeled construct of reality.

3. Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

As a final conceptual tool to help comprehend the prevalence of extraordinary brutality in communal warfare, a brief introduction to the erosion of social constraints on behavior is instructive. Albert Bandura provides an exceptionally keen, conceptual framework for analysis of this phenomenon, the components of which he terms "The

Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement."³¹ Although Bandura writes specifically at the individual level of analysis, the socially constructed justifications for atavistic behavior that he describes, apply equally to inter-group activity as well. Bandura's poignant observation on individual behavior provides a fitting introduction to this section. He writes:

Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel things.³²

A brief introduction to the mechanisms by which this cruelty occurs, provides the final point of departure from which to proceed with this paper's analysis of violent communal conflict.

Bandura argues that self-sanction plays a central role in the regulation of inhumane conduct. "In the course of socialization," he writes, "people adopt moral standards that serve as guides and deterrents for conduct. Once internalized control has developed, people regulate their actions by the sanctions they apply to themselves."³³ It follows then, that a re-socialization process such as that of reconstructing reality similarly *alters* moral standards, thereby redefining or removing existing guides and deterrents for conduct.

Self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and, as Bandura explains, "There are many psychological processes by which moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct."³⁴ This is as true for group activity as it is for individual conduct. The perpetration of previously prohibited acts of violence upon communal neighbors is justified through a gradual--albeit ever accelerating--process of remodeling the perceived realities of inter-group competition. Although an in depth

³¹See Albert Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," in *Origins of Terrorism*, ed., Walter Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990): 161-191.

³²*Ibid.*, 161.

³³*Ibid.*

³⁴*Ibid.*

analysis of each of Bandura's specific mechanisms is beyond the limited scope of this paper, Table 2 provides a concise overview of the key steps along the path of moral disengagement:

- Euphemistic labeling
- Advantageous comparison
- Displacement of responsibility
- Diffusion of responsibility
- Disregard for, or distortion of, consequences
- Dehumanization
- Attribution of blame

Table 2: Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

Through the above mentioned steps, both individuals and groups fundamentally redefine their perceptions of moral reality, as regards communal competitors, thereby pardoning themselves the self-sanction that might otherwise accompany acts of cruelty toward other human beings. Specific examples of both the reconstruction and moral disengagement processes at work will be provided in Chapters III and IV of this paper.

D. HISTORY IN PERSPECTIVE

As a final point, the social construction-lens is intended to illustrate the commonly misinterpreted role of history in communal conflict. Skilled policy analysts and media pundits alike, too often succumb to temptations to oversimplify the significance of "historical animosities" in defining the character of violent communal conflagrations.

Whether its role is over-estimated or excessively discounted, the true significance of history as a resource pool for social construction is seldom recognized.

History is sometimes represented as an all-encompassing, inescapable pre-determinant to the course of a given conflict. Such fatalistic assessments are often cited by policy makers intent on avoiding involvement in a foreign war. The simple but careless explanation that the citizens of a particular communal region have *always* fought one another provides a ready rationalization for inaction. Merely to call a situation "hopeless," however, does not a hopeless situation make. That is, while such palliatives afford a level moral comfort to distant viewers, they have bearing neither on the true complexion of a given conflict nor on its actual prognosis for resolution. Such labels merely complicate the already difficult task of conflict analysis.

In other instances, analysts misidentify the role of history by discounting it entirely. They argue that individuals are entirely responsible for their own behavior, irrespective of the historical legacy of conflict with a competing social group. This approach is inadequate because it ignores the role which such legacies play in establishing the very standards of behavior to which the individual is expected to adhere.

The true significance of history to the course and character of communal conflict is as a ready resource pool of materials for the social construction of reality. Long dormant historical relics of jealousy, mistrust, and prejudice are--as discussed earlier--passed along in pieces from one generation to the next and are thereby maintained within the group's collective belief system. This accessible body of material facilitates the rapid recreation of opposing communal groups as villainous aggressors and accounts for the speed with which inter-group strife may be transformed to full-scale communal warfare.

In most interstate conflicts, by contrast, no such resource pool is readily available. The story of conflict must, therefore, be constructed from nothing. The vilification

process in such cases takes much longer and is difficult to accomplish with the same level of comprehensiveness that regularly characterizes violent communal conflagrations.³⁵

Analysts should thus regard the significance of history in communal conflict as a supply system of material for social construction. Latent stereotypes provide the potential story-line along which, under specific conditions, a story of conflict may be rewritten by deft, politically motivated authors. History reveals scattered pieces of cognitive text which may be reordered by later generations and arranged on the pages of communal life as a republished story of inter-group conflict. The book of communal conflict thus more closely resembles a popular novel than a well-researched biography.

In summary, one reason for the intractable nature of communal warfare is that the basic tenets of conflict are fabricated with the help of historically preserved, culturally propagated animus.³⁶ Crucial to comprehending the passionate natures of such conflicts is the realization that the issues at stake are interpreted inter-subjectively. These interpretations, through a variety of active mechanisms, become objectified as fact within

³⁵An interesting illustration of this point is provided in John W. Dower, *War Without Mercy* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986). Dower contrasts the stark differences in the perceptions which Americans held toward their W.W.II rivals, Japan and Germany. Partly because of distinct differences in physical characteristics, and partly due to the long history of prejudicial stereotypes littering America's multi-ethnic communal landscape, the vilification process against the Japanese was prosecuted far more quickly and comprehensively than against the Germans. The widely known discrepancies in treatment between Japanese-Americans and their German-American counterparts during the war is yet another example of the historical communal "resource pool" in action. See Dower, 79.

³⁶Isaacs, 121. On the enduring and powerful influence of historically perpetuated "myths" in ethnic conflict, Isaacs writes: "The Past remains very much alive, whether as fantasy, fiction, or fact, whether it appears out of the mists of 'sacred' time or the smogs of 'chronological' time, whether it is recorded in holy writ or as 'history'...all kinds of 'We' and 'They' continue to revile and kill one another out of the memories provided by both kinds of time and with the sanctions of both kinds of writ." Isaacs cites as an example, an interview given by a Syrian minister of education--quoted by David Gordon (Isaacs, Ch. 7, Note 10)--in which the minister defends the presence of violent passages about Jews in textbooks used in Palestinian refugee camps by stating: "The hatred we instill in our children from birth is a sacred emotion."

the social constructions of reality. These realities, in turn, become regarded as threats to the most sensitive roots of basic group identity.³⁷

It is important for analysts to recognize that core grievances may exist largely in the realm of emotion, and, as *objectified realities*, may bear little resemblance to "objective" reality perceived by those outside the conflict. Consequently, acknowledging the primacy of constructed reality over "objective" fact in determining behavior is among the most fundamental concepts to understanding communal warfare.³⁸ This is perhaps the most difficult notion for intervening powers to comprehend, yet it reveals why many of the standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy used to mediate instrumental wars of politics simply do not work in influencing the course of communal conflicts. As George Santayana once wrote, "There is nothing so helpless as reason when faced with unreason."³⁹ Violent communal conflicts comprise *subjective* constructions of reality that become objectified as essential truths to their psychological adherents. Failure to recognize the existence of unique constructions of reality on each side of a conflict may constitute a cognitive language barrier between combatants and mediator that simply precludes communication.

³⁷Ibid., 206. Isaacs writes, "The dynamism of basic group identity is a function of the mix of what people have inherited and what they have acquired, the mix of culture past and culture present."

³⁸Professor Walker Connor's extensive writings on ethno-nationalism consistently argue that "when analyzing sociopolitical situations, what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is." See Connor, "A nation is a nation," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* October 1978: 380; see also Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation Destroying?" *World Politics* April 1972: 337.

³⁹Cited in Leshan, 42.

III. THE OBJECTIVE-LENS

This paper has, thus far, discussed the first of three specific characteristics which distinguish intra-state communal conflicts, in significant ways, from the wars which comprise America's historical experience. Chapter II provided a basic introduction into the powerful role which social constructions of reality play in defining communal conflicts.

This chapter addresses the second of these key characteristics: the perceived *objectives* of communal conflict.⁴⁰ It examines the role which objectives--identified and articulated through the social construction process--play in differentiating these wars from other types of political violence. It points out that some violent communal conflicts are interpreted as *zero sum* struggles for survival by the combatants within them; but that others are clearly waged to secure politically determined objectives such as greater political representation in government or improved social status.

This dichotomy between absolute and limited motives indicates that--depending upon the nature of the objectives--conflicts tend toward one of two fundamentally distinct dimensions: *non-zero sum* wars of politics and *zero sum* of struggles for existence. While some of the world's past and present conflagrations may be characterized as being of the former category, it is the position of this paper that many, if not most, violent communal conflicts are perceived by the participants as being of the latter category: zero sum struggles for existence.

⁴⁰For a superb introduction of the core dynamics underlying communal conflict, see Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.) The difficulty one encounters in the temptation to define the "rationality" of any particular conflict is, as Lucian Pye eloquently observes in his forward to Isaac's *Idols*, "what have frequently been seen as the workings of the 'irrational' are in fact the very elements that make us human."

Analysts seeking to mediate a specific conflict should ask some very important questions to discern the essential character of the contest:

- What objectives are at stake?
- Are they *limited*, that is, governed by political calculations and consequently subject to cost-benefit analyses and bargaining behavior?
- Are they *divisible*, that is, can they be divided--equitably or otherwise--between the combatants?
- Or, as is frequently the case in communal warfare, is the objective in question *indivisible*--zero sum competition in the most absolute sense--with "winner-take-all" as the ultimate outcome?
- Finally, is the conflict perceived as a struggle for cultural or physical *survival*, an objective which brooks neither cost-value calculation nor compromise?

Answers to these questions are invaluable in determining the basic complexion of whichever conflict a mediator might face. They allow the analyst to differentiate between non-zero sum games of politics and zero sum games of survival.

Most inter-state conflicts, indeed, all of those in America's experience, fall into the former category as limited wars of politics. Intra-state communal conflicts, by contrast, incline toward the latter perception as unlimited wars for survival. Distinguishing between these two classes is the purview of policy-makers around the world as they grapple with responses to newly emerging international conflicts. Early and accurate classification is of paramount importance, for all subsequent policy decisions will likely derive from the initial frame of reference.

A. CLAUSEWITZ'S DUAL NATURE THEORY

The concept of wars existing along a continuum of violence, with the opposing dimensions of *limited war* on one end and *absolute war* on the other, is not a new concept. Carl von Clausewitz grappled with this dichotomy centuries ago, in an effort to

explain the disparate intensities with which wars of the Eighteenth Century were prosecuted. The perspective of this chapter differs slightly in that it seeks to position wars, conceptually, along the Clausewitzian continuum based on the nature of the *objectives* over which they are fought: Non-zero sum conflict (politics by other means) fits toward the limited end of the spectrum, while zero sum communal warfare (survival by other means) tends toward the absolute end. A brief introduction to Clausewitz's perspective on the continuum's limited and absolute dimensions is useful to understanding the zero sum/non-zero sum framework presented here as well.

Many of Clausewitz's theories on war--predicated on notions of the nation-state--are diminishing in utility for analysts assessing the modern global environment of sub-national ethnic and religious conflagrations. Nonetheless, some of his writings remain relevant. Specifically, Clausewitz's concept of the *dual nature* of warfare is useful as a conceptual tool with which to examine the relationship between the objectives over which a conflict is ostensibly waged and the war's actual complexion. Moreover, this *dual nature* continuum provides a cogent framework for contrasting zero sum versus non-zero sum conflicts around the world.

The basic underpinning of Clausewitzian thought is that all wars, indeed all battles, are different. Therefore, there exists no such thing as a *norm of war*. Consequently, there can be no *standard policy* that may be applied uniformly to all conflicts. Each war is unique in its variable composition of elements, a "remarkable trinity," composed of violence and passion; uncertainty, chance and probability; and political purpose and effect.⁴¹

⁴¹See Peter Paret, "Clausewitz," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Ed., Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986): 201.

Clausewitz distinguishes between two levels of warfare, *limited* and *absolute*, based primarily on objectives and scope. In his analysis of the classic work, *On War*, Peter Paret cites Clausewitz's discussion of two basic types of warfare:

War can be of two kinds, in the sense that either the objective is to *overthrow the enemy*--to render him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace we please; or *merely to occupy some of his frontier-districts* so that we can annex them or use them for bargaining at the peace negotiations. Transitions from one type to the other will of course recur in my treatment; but the fact that the aims of the two types are quite different must be clear at all times, and their points of irreconcilability brought out.

This distinction between the two kinds of war is an actual fact. But no less practical is the importance of another point that must be made absolutely clear, namely that *war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means*. If this is firmly kept in mind throughout, it will greatly facilitate the study of the subject and the whole will be easier to analyze.⁴² (Italics in the original, underlining added for emphasis.)

Clausewitz's *dual nature* theory is thus predicated upon the *objectives* of the political and military leaders on each side of a given conflict.

Clausewitz held that virtually all wars are instrumental, that is, premised on rational intent on the part of warring states' political leadership.⁴³ Wars are fought not for their own sake but for a political purpose and are therefore subject to rational constraints that influence tactics. Presumably, leaders favor those tactics that contribute most directly to attaining specified political objectives. This is the essence of Clausewitz's concept of limited warfare, that political motives determine both the military objectives and the tactical means by which to attain those objectives. A purely military strategy does not exist in limited war.⁴⁴

⁴²Peter Paret, *Understanding War* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992): 106.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 20.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 19.

Clausewitz believed, in the absence of political constraints, the basic nature of humans in combat compels opponents inexorably toward an escalation of violence. "A clash of forces freely operating and obedient to no law but their own,' eventually reaches the extreme--absolute war, that is, absolute violence ending in the total destruction of one side by the other."⁴⁵ Theoretically, warfare of this nature is characterized by unrestrained, indiscriminate violence ending in the extermination of the losing side. Clausewitz did not believe that absolute war existed in reality because the internal dynamics of conflict are always influenced by forces external to it. As Paret notes, "War is affected by the specific characteristics of the states in conflict and by the general characteristics of the time--its political, economic, technological, and social elements. These may inhibit the escalation to total violence."⁴⁶ Indeed, Clausewitz concluded that absolute war was a theoretical construct, unreachable in real life. In the real world the absolute is always modified, although, in select cases of genocide, it is closely approached.⁴⁷

Though few conflicts in reality reach the level of absolute war, the utility of the *dual nature* thesis as a framework for analyzing a wide variety of lesser intra-national conflicts remains useful. The definitions of *limited* and *unlimited* war--dependent upon objectives--provide theoretical boundaries between which float virtually all of the world's conflicts: historical, present, and future. Clausewitz's approach encompasses the full range of

⁴⁵Ibid., 109.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid. Paret cites "certain Napoleonic campaigns, or in the attempt of one primitive tribe attempting to exterminate another" as examples of conflicts that approached absolute war. By expanding this definition to include specific campaigns within the context of greater political conflagrations, the number of potential twentieth century incidents approaching unlimited war increases broadly. The Turkish massacre of Armenians of 1915, Hitler's campaign against the European Jews (1939-45), the intra-Yugoslavian genocide of World War II, Pol Pot's purge of "foreign influenced imperialists" in Cambodia (1975-79), and Saddam Hussein's ongoing efforts to eradicate Iraq's Kurdish population, to name but a few.

organized mass violence, including intra-state communal conflict. To frame this chapter's thesis in Clausewitzian perspective once again, non-zero sum conflict (politics by other means) fits toward the limited end of the spectrum, while zero sum communal warfare (survival by other means) tends toward the absolute end.

1. The Limitations of Clausewitz

Though Clausewitz's theoretical continuum is trenchant in discussing the scope and comparative scale of warfare in general terms, it goes only part way toward providing a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics within specific conflicts, as Yugoslavia, from which to build appropriate American responses. Given that the study of Clausewitz is basic to U.S. military and diplomatic doctrine, it is important to recognize the limitations of his theories and thereby avoid misguided analysis based on inappropriate assumptions.

While Clausewitz's *dual nature* theory offers certain useful conceptual insights to communal conflict resolution, there are at least two significant limitations to the broader body of Clausewitzian theory. First, Clausewitz (writing in Europe during the early Nineteenth Century) assumed a state-based, instrumentalist, *rational actor* perspective which is of but marginal applicability to modern intra-state, inter-national--and indeed, in some cases, *intra*-national--communal conflicts. Second, his *Dual Nature* theory notwithstanding, Clausewitz's inclination toward political purpose as the fundamental objective of war may contribute to U.S. policy makers' potentially dangerous *mirror imaging* preferences when evaluating the motives of foreign parties in conflict.⁴⁸ Makers of U.S. foreign policy should beware, they will face great dilemmas in attempting to "force-fit" diplomatic strategies designed for non-zero sum wars of politics onto inherently zero sum wars for existence.

⁴⁸"Mirror imaging," as used here, refers to the tendency to ascribe to another the manner of thinking that guides one's own behavior.

B. THE ANALYST'S DILEMMA: DIFFERENTIATING ZERO SUM FROM NON-ZERO SUM CONFLICT

To be of any practical theoretical utility, the notions of *non-zero sum* and *zero sum* objectives of conflict must manifest distinct characteristics largely antithetical to one another. In reality, few, if any, conflicts fall entirely into one class or the other; most manifest elements of each. For this reason, the analyst must become conditioned to think in terms of *dimensions* rather than *absolutes* when attempting to characterize any given conflict.

Moreover, within a given communal conflict, reciprocal views may exist; that is, one faction may regard the battle as a struggle for existence while the other may not. The analyst, and certainly the policy maker, must understand each faction's core objective. Is it political, or is it survival?

To discuss further the key role of *objectives* in determining the character of violent communal conflicts, it is necessary to establish definitional distinctions between the use of the terms "zero sum" and "non-zero sum" as analytic concepts.

1. Non-Zero Sum Conflict

Non-zero sum conflict, as discussed here, falls within the basic confines of the prevailing paradigm for conflict analysis which holds that political purpose governs military means and objectives. "Violence should express political purpose," as Peter Paret notes in his classic work *Understanding War*, "and express it in a rational, utilitarian manner; it should not take the place of the political purpose, nor obliterate it."⁴⁹ This notion is useful, albeit potentially deceiving, to analysts because it implies that political leaders in all conflicts implement basic cost-benefit analyses in establishing their goals. In

⁴⁹See Paret, *Understanding War*, 110.

the *non-zero sum* (limited) view of war, the traditional American perspective, leaders gauge the expected value of a particular objective against the expected cost of achieving it.⁵⁰ This basic principle may be expressed as a ratio (EV/EC) where:

$$\frac{\text{Expected Value (gain)}}{\text{Expected Cost (loss)}} = \text{Relative desirability of a particular venture}$$

The resultant dividend must equal or exceed "1" for the venture to be properly considered as an instrumental, rational strategy of limited war; that is, the *expected value* to be gained must be equal to or greater than the *expected cost* of securing the intended objective.⁵¹ The degree to which these theoretical expectations become reality is determined *in the doing*, by strategies, tactics, war-fighting ability, and a host of other variables encompassed by Clausewitz's famous *imponderables*, which separate the theory of battle from war as it truly is.

To summarize, the classifier *non-zero sum* describes a conflict involving *divisible* political objectives and measured trade-offs aimed at achieving these objectives. That is, the objective may be divided--equitably or otherwise--between the groups in conflict. The ultimate outcome is subject to bargaining strategies and coercive diplomacy, both violent and non-violent. This is a fundamental point for U.S. policy-makers to recognize. It bears particular significance to America's efforts to mediate or intervene in *non-zero sum* conflicts. The key factor in such instrumental wars of politics is the EV/EC

⁵⁰An insightful analysis of the rationale behind beginning and ending wars is provided by Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1971). Citing the potentially grave costs of embarking upon war, Ikle writes: "Indeed, after prolonged and costly fighting, not only the losing nations but also the victors are often torn by political upheavals." (59.) Ikle's assertion that grave risks exist in precipitating conflict is empirically founded and, hence, one must assume that rational political leaders expect the value to be gained from an offensive military enterprise to be substantial.

⁵¹For a far more comprehensive, theoretical analysis of the "rational actor" model of international relations, see Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap*.

ratio described above. The strategic endgame of intervention is to raise the aggressor's costs of continued warfare ($EC \uparrow$) to a point above the value it expects to gain ($EC > EV$), thereby lessening the desirability of the entire enterprise ($EV/EC \downarrow$).

2. The Tendency Toward Zero Sum

Because the objectives at stake in many communal conflicts are essentially non-political--namely, preservation of culture, homeland, and physical survival--these conflicts manifest a marked tendency toward "zero sum." The term *zero sum*, borrowed from the vocabulary of economists, describes a hypothetical situation in which a "resource pool"--the objective of any given competition--is finite and indivisible. Competition for resources in a "zero sum game" is therefore *absolute*. One gains only as another loses. In such a scenario, it is not possible to cooperatively expand the resource pool so that both competitors can increase their individual holdings simultaneously and each emerge as winners. One must win and one must lose. Hence total gain for one equals total loss for the other.

In examining political violence we may, with only minor alterations, use the zero sum concept to qualify conflicts both between states and between social groups within states. Like the economic version, this "zero sum" classification requires that the objectives in question be perceived by the competitors to be finite. To add definitional rigor, it will be used here to describe specifically those conflicts in which the competing parties perceive their struggles to be *absolute* in the sense that one wins all and survives, while the other loses all and perishes. In such conflicts it may be inferred that a "war of existence" mentality exists on the part of at least one, if not each, of the opposing sides.

Clearly, a battle against an aggressor's attempt to exterminate a cultural or racial minority would be considered *zero sum* by the beleaguered minority. Similarly, a struggle to defend one's *homeland* against the territorial aggression of a hostile communal

opponent would be regarded as essentially zero sum in nature.⁵² Social environments rich with latent communal strife abound with leaders and followers who are willing to view alternatives from a zero sum perspective. It is this perspective which precipitates indiscriminate violence by armed factions thereby creating an environment of incoherent force. It is these acts of seemingly random violence which fuel rapid, often unpalatable escalation.

Yet again, a recurring malady of American diplomacy, the tendency to *mirror image*, has become manifest in foreign policy. At the inter-state level, analysts *mirror image* by attributing to belligerent governments precisely the same mechanisms of decision-making that govern U.S. policy. Since Americans generally view war in *instrumental* terms, namely, as military *means* to a political *end*, there is a strong tendency to project this same mind set upon participants in foreign conflicts as well. Mirror imaging may lead American analysts to define the objective of a particular conflict as non-zero sum (ergo negotiable), while the combatants' own perceptions may be quite different. One-dimensional analyses which ignore social constructions of reality that do not match those of the U.S. yield myopic and misinformed conclusions which, in turn, yield bad policies.

⁵²Some scholars downplay the significance of ancient inter-ethnic antagonisms in distinguishing communal conflicts as a unique class of warfare. They hold that ethnic wars are merely campaigns of territorial aggression by another name, see Professor Peter Waldmann's paper entitled "Violent Separatism," presented at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association, 1988. This position does not contradict, but rather supports the concept of the *zero sum* nature of communal warfare. It would be difficult to argue that eradication of a culture via forced expulsion of its members from their ethnic homelands (e.g. Jews of antiquity, nineteenth century American Indians, et al) would be regarded as significantly less *absolute*, by the victims, than outright physical genocide. Therefore, I propose that the defense of territorial homelands against aggression might be regarded as no less *zero sum* than would the resurgence of a *Hitlerite* "final solution," or another such campaign bent on the physical destruction of members of a specifically targeted ethnic or religious group.

U.S. policy toward Bosnia will be discussed later in this chapter as a possible example of the pitfalls associated with such an approach.

C. STRATEGIES FOR MEDIATION

If one accepts that the objectives upon which conflicts are predicated run to the extreme dimensions of politics and survival, then one must agree that no single approach to war resolution is suitable for all situations. The zero sum/non-zero sum dichotomy elaborated thus far in this chapter, argues that identifying the objectives upon which many violent communal conflicts are based provides essential guidance for the adoption of strategies appropriate for each individual circumstance.

1. Existing Strategies for Non-Zero Sum Conflict

America's diplomatic arsenal has evolved from participation in instrumental (non-zero sum) wars of politics at the inter-state level. Its available means of coercive diplomacy thus include a variety of military and non-military tactics designed to accomplish such intervention.

At the lowest level of intensity are subtle diplomatic pressures intended to express the U.S. Government's displeasure with a given conflict, or with morally unacceptable military tactics occurring therein. Early in disagreements between foreign countries, policy makers endeavor to communicate America's desire for a peaceful resolution via implied threats at the lowest possible diplomatic level. If necessary to increase pressure, the U.S. may offer to sponsor negotiations between opposing parties. Non-participation is discouraged by threats of suspending economic assistance programs, if such exist, or by the interruption of established trade patterns between the U.S. and either or all belligerents. Should a hostile government remain intransigent to diplomatic

measures, a number of forcible military options exist for intervention in a non-zero sum conflict scenario.

Economic blockades by air, land, or sea are among the least destructive options that function specifically to raise the economic costs of continued resistance to negotiated settlement. The success of any economic embargo is dependent upon a number of variables including but not limited to: the extent to which neighboring countries *support or oppose the embargo*; the level of *economic self-sufficiency and reserves* within the penalized country; *the degree of solidarity* among the sanctioned populace in favor of its leaders' objectives; and perhaps most importantly, the *aggressor's pain threshold*, that is, the price that country is willing to pay to realize its military ambitions. Embargoes may also be applied selectively, denying the aggressor access to economic and military supplies, while simultaneously providing the defender precisely those types of assistance.

Successful embargoes raise the costs of continued aggression considerably, but often require more time to take effect than a beleaguered defender can sustain. In such cases, direct intervention by external military force becomes necessary. Those powers contemplating intervention must then reassess the economic and political capital they are willing to expend to stop the hostilities, and choose from the military options available at a price deemed acceptable.

Strategic bombing, a tool popularized by success in the Persian Gulf War, has become a method of choice in forcible coercive diplomacy.⁵³ Bombs are relatively inexpensive compared to ground-force intervention and, more importantly, they represent to the American public a relatively sterile mechanism for dispensing measured retribution. As Lewis Gann notes, "An air raid in some ways appears like a catastrophe of nature," a

⁵³For but one of countless examples of politicians favoring immediate bombing as the solution in Bosnia, see Dennis Deconcini, "Bomb the Serbs. Now." *New York Times* 18 May 1993, nat'l. ed.: A15.

catastrophe whose wrath falls primarily upon those most deserving of retribution.⁵⁴ For these and other reasons, strategic bombing is often touted as a panacea in congressional debates on military intervention.⁵⁵ The dilemma of coercive air power is that effectiveness varies with terrain: open, flat areas with little cover are particularly good; mountain and jungle areas affording both cover and concealment are especially poor.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, strategic bombing can be a quick, effective means to raise the costs of continued warfare by exacting a heavy toll on the economic and military infrastructures of the targeted state in an instrumental war of politics.

Failure to penetrate the aggressor's pain threshold by implementing the previously mentioned options may forewarn of incomplete analyses on the part of external mediators. Such was clearly the case in the Persian Gulf War where Iraq's President, Saddam Hussein, faced obviously insurmountable odds yet refused to withdraw from Kuwait. Despite an enormous, unified international military coalition led by the world's

⁵⁴Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History* (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1971): 79.

⁵⁵U.S. military officials including former JCS Chairman, General Colin Powell, and current Chairman, General John Shalikashvili, have repeatedly testified before Congress explaining the limitations of air power and urging caution. Misha Glenny cites testimony by General Shalikashvili, and offers his own admonitions regarding strategic bombing in "What Is To Be Done," *The New York Review* 27 May 1993: 16. Glenny writes: "General John Shalikashvili recently counseled caution. 'Bombing limited targets, for instance, is more difficult than people think and there is also no guarantee that such an act would bring a party to the negotiating table.' This means that bombing risks further inflaming the situation on the ground for no real purpose other than an understandable but misguided desire for retribution--retribution that may also kill civilians." Glenny concludes, "The great problem with the bombing that has recently been proposed is that it has no clear political policy that it wishes to reinforce--it is instead an expression of moral indignation, which is quite justified, masquerading as policy."

⁵⁶An excellent discussion of the prospects for strategic bombing in Bosnia is provided in John J. Mearsheimer and Robert A. Pape, "The Answer," *New Republic* 14 June 1993: 24-25. Pape and Mearsheimer write: "In theory, air power can be used three different ways: to decapitate an opponent's leadership, to punish an opponent's population or to weaken an opponent's military forces. Of these, only the last stands a chance of being effective, *but only if it is applied in conjunction with ground power.*" (Emphasis added.)

greatest military super-power, Hussein refused to back down. Enormous costs had already been levied by heavy Allied bombardment of Iraqi troops, equipment, and infrastructure, and the promise of long-term, crippling economic sanctions against his country was certain to be fulfilled. Nonetheless, Allied intervention with ground troops was required to finally expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait. As an international pariah, Iraq continues today to pay the heavy costs of its leader's ill-considered behavior.

If air campaigns fail to halt hostilities, ground force intervention remains the only feasible choice. In such a case, U.S. or coalition ground troops may be required to physically evict the aggressor from contested territory, increasing enemy ground losses beyond the price it is willing or able to pay. In the process, sufficient damage must be inflicted to give considerable pause to jingoistic aggression in the future. Once the contested territory is secured and a local government reestablished, coalition forces may be withdrawn. A repeat performance will be severely inhibited because the aggressor's costs will have proven to far outweigh the political value it expected to gain.

In summary, a fairly wide range of options exists for influencing instrumental (non-zero sum) wars fought between states to achieve limited political gains. A state seeking a political objective attaches to it a given value that determines the price it is willing to pay to win it (basic principles of cost/benefit analysis). Achievement of the political objective is thereby governed by a calculus of strategic bargaining in which the ratio of expected value to expected cost (EV/EC) determines whether or not state will resort to war. This is the single most significant characteristic of non-zero sum wars for policy makers to understand: *such conflicts may, theoretically, be effectively influenced through standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy.*

2. Zero Sum Conflict in Contrast

In marked contrast to the logical Clausewitzian precepts governing non-zero sum warfare, the objectives in *zero sum* conflict are perceived as issues essential to basic group survival.⁵⁷ Participants within such conflicts often believe themselves to be engaged in an absolute fight for life. In such situations, the standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy are of significantly diminished utility.

In analyzing zero sum conflicts, the key role of social constructed reality becomes clearly evident. At the very least, combatants regard their struggles as a wholly justified defense of ancestral homelands, and heroic resistance against a territorial aggressor bent upon driving *them* from *their* land. In many instances, each participant to the conflict similarly regards the geographically finite region of land as rightfully *his*. The attempts of each to expel or exterminate the other serve merely to reinforce the conviction of a zero-sum battle for survival on all sides.

For external mediators, approximate valuation of the relatively mundane political objectives over which limited wars are fought may be a fairly simple task. The issues comprising zero sum communal conflict, by contrast, are predicated upon socially constructed perceptions of reality that may differ entirely from the "objective" reality perceived by mediators outside the conflict. Such zero sum communal conflicts arise, ostensibly, from ethnic and religious hatreds, and resurgent historic nationalism, and are inextricably linked to such immutable concepts as *homeland* and *basic group identity*.⁵⁸

⁵⁷This thesis was presented by Professor Walker Connor, in a series of lectures on the subject of ethno-national conflict, 19-24 April 1993, at the Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California.

⁵⁸See Cynthia Enloe's superb work on the ethnic and communal dynamics of divided societies, *Ethnic Soldiers* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). Enloe's simple ascriptive definition of ethnicity: "a basis of collective identity derived from shared descent and *rooted in sub-rational emotions*," supports the basic working concept with which this paper proceeds in its discussion of communal conflict. (Emphasis added, 4.)

Communal warfare of this nature quickly becomes--to play upon the famous Clausewitzian maxim--expressions of *passion* by other means.

This is significant because conflicts waged for objectives believed to be crucial to a group's physical or cultural survival are far less constrained, if at all, by political considerations. For this reason zero sum conflict conceptually resembles the specter of absolute war discussed earlier in this paper. In contrast to its limited, non-zero sum counterpart, the objectives of zero sum conflict are, theoretically, *much less subject to standard mechanisms of coercive diplomacy.*

Efforts to uniformly apply the same set of diplomatic strategies to both zero sum and non-zero sum conflicts are doomed to failure for at least four reasons. First, zero sum conflict is defined by issues seldom subject to rational bargaining strategies, thus making diplomatic pressures irrelevant. Second, zero sum conflict is widely perceived by the combatants to be a battle for national or cultural survival, thereby making success a national imperative at whatever cost is required (EV↑↑↑). Third, short of long-term pseudo-colonial occupation or total annihilation of the aggressor force, intervening powers cannot raise the expected costs (EC) of continued aggression high enough to secure lasting peace--making the EV/EC ratio irrelevant. And, fourth, any punitive external measures are likely to reinforce the targeted party's sense of victimization causing it to assume an increasingly fatalistic and recalcitrant stance. For these reasons alone, intervention in zero sum conflicts requires a fundamental reappraisal of coercive diplomacy.⁵⁹

⁵⁹Commenting on the importance of developing a dynamic approach to mediating such conflicts, Misha Glenny writes: "There are dozens of other nationalist disputes fermenting in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. In order to find a long-term solution for these problems, a normative system must be developed and applied to these regions. At the moment, the international community lacks this and is also short of resources...The more these disputes develop into open warfare, the more urgent the need for a systematic approach to these problems becomes, but given the pressures which are determining

D. A LOUSY VIEW: YUGOSLAVIA THROUGH THE OBJECTIVE-LENS

The potential ineffectualness of misguided policy is nowhere more evident than in the republics of the former Yugoslavia, clear examples of zero sum warfare in all its fury. From the beginning, Western leaders ignored the significance of complex ethno-national bonds between the Yugoslav republics. Recognition was granted to the seceding states of Slovenia and Croatia long before policy makers realized the significance of the grievances expressed by the large Serb minorities opposing secession within each republic.⁶⁰ In Bosnia, the West collectively ignored the sole legal mechanism of stability, the principle of *dual sovereignty*, which required that constitutional changes be agreed upon by the republic's three constituent nations. This safeguard was shelved by Bosnia's Muslims and Croats who used support from Germany and the EC to declare independence by referendum in March, 1992, in spite of the Serbs' fears. Thus with the hapless encouragement of Western powers—ignorant of the powder keg with which they trifled—war in Bosnia was diplomatically precipitated.

It is incorrect, however, to ascribe *too much* responsibility for Yugoslavia's current plight to Western powers, for the war is essentially home-grown. It is built upon fears of

foreign policy development in the USA, Europe and Japan, it is unlikely that an international political model for combating nationalist instability will be created." See *The Fall*, 100.

⁶⁰See Misha Glenny, "The Yugoslav War as the 'Revenger's Tragedy'," *Meeting Report*, Woodrow Wilson Center for East European Studies, #81, 8 Apr. 1993: 4. To the question: "What should the West be doing in the Balkans?" Glenny responds, "First, it must be honest and admit that it has made a substantial contribution to the chaos in the region. The Western diplomatic community completely failed to anticipate a well-signaled conflict. Policy-makers must recognize that the West has made serious mistakes, particularly the premature recognition of Croatia, and that it is too late to hope for a 'just' solution. The West must act pragmatically because it has lost the opportunity to act in a principled fashion." (Emphasis added.)

aggression and genocide between one party which claims Bosnia as part of its "historic" homeland, and the others which have occupied the majority of the region for centuries. The present viciousness of the warfare in Bosnia is the product of reinvented nationalist hatred, and distortions of history that reach near farcical proportions on all sides.⁶¹ Each of the opposing groups holds the others in bizarre caricature, attributing to them the most sinister, sub-human attributes, none of which bear much resemblance to the truth. Yet, in communal conflicts, truth is seldom an equal match against national myths. The people of Yugoslavia no longer view themselves as citizens of a state but rather as members of psychological security collectives within a finite territory in which their group only is justified to exist.⁶²

The Serbs have shown clearly that their two main objectives--the achievement of a geographically contiguous Greater Serbia, and ethnic homogeneity within Serb territories--are issues not subject to diplomatic compromise. Clearly, the Muslims' battle to retain a place within a viable Bosnian state is regarded as a struggle for cultural survival, and the siege-style artillery attacks in such places as Sarajevo and Mostar represent to the Muslims an obvious struggle for physical survival as well. These goals have become equated in the general consciousness with national survival. Illustrations of a pervasive solidarity in Serb national consciousness--one which transcends state boundaries--are replete throughout the

⁶¹The most absurd abuses of history are embraced by Serbs in their attempts to justify the brutal aggression in Bosnia. See Edward Barnes, "Behind The Serbian Lines," *Time* 17 May 1993: 34. Barnes writes, "The fighters live in what can only be called 'Serbian reality,' the world as defined by the propaganda, lies, myth and aggrieved sense of history that have been swallowed whole by the population. They are certain that the fascists and the Islamic fundamentalists are at their throats. They are sure that the Muslims and Croats who once lived next door are nothing short of monsters. An army medical officer explained that Croat children are taught that Serbs' most popular sport is killing children." See also, Glenny, *The Fall*, 85.

⁶²See Gramoz Pashko, "The Balkans: Ethnic Identity Versus The Modern Nation," *World Press Review* June 1993: 8.

periodical literature emerging from the Balkans. For many Serbs the war is truly regarded as a *zero sum game*, in the most classic sense, against an Islamic onslaught from the west. A sample of the mind-set typical of many Serb officials throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is provided by an interview with Simo Drljaca, the police chief of Prijedor, Bosnia:

You Americans do not understand ethnic warfare because you fight only clean wars, like Kuwait and Vietnam. We do not have that luxury. *We Serbs are fighting to save ourselves from genocide.* In ethnic warfare the enemy doesn't wear a uniform or carry a gun. *Everyone is the enemy.* (Emphasis added.)⁶³

Far from representing an anomaly of the radical fringe, Mr. Drljaca's perspective reflects mainstream Serb opinion. Such absolute views help explain, at least in part, the atavistic behavior that has come to characterize the greater Balkan conflict. Unbridled brutality has been the rule in Bosnia, rather than the exception.

Similar observations on the essentially zero sum Serb perceptions of the Yugoslav war are illustrated by Misha Glenny, in *The Fall of Yugoslavia*. He recounts a conversation with a policeman in the Bosnian city of Tuzla:

I took a short walk with a local Serb policeman to discuss the situation with him. He confirmed the countless observations which I had made when talking to local fighters of all nationalities—he was not a man of evil. On the contrary, he explained how he found it very difficult to shoot at the other side of his village, because he knew everybody who lived there. But the war had somehow arrived and he had to defend his home. The man was confused and upset by the events but he now perceived the Green Berets and the Ustashes to be a real threat to his family. "We cannot let them form an Islamic state here," he said with genuine passion. "Are you sure they want to?" I asked him. "Of course they want to. I don't understand why you people outside don't realize that we are fighting for Europe against a foreign religion." There was nothing disingenuous about this simple man. His only mistake was to believe the nonsense that his local community had learned from Serbian television and the local branch of the SDS. He, too, is a victim.⁶⁴

⁶³See Maj. Gen. Edward B. Atkeson, "Who Will Sweep Up The Augean Stables?" *Army* May 1993: 23.

⁶⁴Glenny, *The Fall*, 171-72.

The depth of Yugoslavia's crisis is due to such widespread zero sum perceptions, each feeding upon the next, embellished along the way by a simple yet frightened people whose lives have been deeply scarred by limitless violence. This environment of fear, revived ethnic hatred, and pseudo-nationalist fervor has been deftly manipulated by ex-Communist Serb politicians, such as Slobodan Milosevic, to tighten their tenuous grasp on power.

The distinction between zero sum and non-zero sum conflict is particularly salient in light of current wars in Yugoslavia and elsewhere. The Balkan conflict, misread by American analysts from the outset, has since been poorly handled by both the Bush and Clinton Administrations. Because of the failure to correctly recognize key internal dynamics of the conflict, diplomats dithered as the war expanded. Through a series of inappropriate bluffs and half-measures, the *zero sum* communal competition in Bosnia has been inadvertently prolonged while simultaneously sustaining damage to America's credibility as the world's leader.⁶⁵

E. A GLOBAL OVERVIEW THROUGH THE OBJECTIVE-LENS

As a final illustration of the prevalence of perceived zero-sum objectives in communal conflict, a brief glance at several of the world's currently raging civil wars should suffice. Communal conflicts as disparate as those in Israel (Jews vs. Palestinians), the Sudan (Northern Islamic Arabs and Southern Arab tribes vs. Southern Black African Christians/Aminists), Iraq (Sunni Muslims vs. Kurds and Shiites), Somalia (inter-clan

⁶⁵For but one of many articles arguing the potential global implications of America's failure in Bosnia, see "The Abdication," by the editors of the *New Republic* 28 Feb. 1994: 1-9. Specifically regarding the repercussions of America's damaged credibility they write, "the American interests that are implicated by the Serbian war are not only regional, they are also global. The audience for Bill Clinton's prevarications includes Kim Il Sung and Saddam Hussein and Raoul Cedras and Mohamed Farah Aidid and a host of petty fascists in fledgling states who have been wondering about their freedom of action. And what he is telling them all is: act freely, we are busy with ourselves. Clinton does not see that he is making a more recalcitrant world." (9.)

warfare between Somalis), and, as previously discussed, Bosnia (inter-factional warfare between Serbs, Croats and Muslims), illustrate but a few of the various faces of zero sum conflict spreading rapidly across the globe. Although each of these conflicts differs significantly from the others, they are also similar in many ways. Perhaps the strongest single thread running through the group is the absolute nature of the objectives upon which each conflict is predicated.

1. Israel

The long-running battle between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews in the occupied territories of Israel's West Bank and Gaza regions provides an apt example of zero sum objectives in conflict. Specifically, the recent proliferation of random violence between radical Jewish settlers and militant Palestinians comes out of what is broadly perceived to be a battle for survival by each side of the conflict. In a recent article for the *New York Times*, columnist William Safire accurately, if not altogether objectively, summarized the objectives that have come to define the conflict:

The goal of the warmakers is not lunatic: each seeks the expulsion of the other from "their" territory. The Hebron killer's Kach faction wants Arabs driven across the Jordan River, while Hamas, the Hezbollah and Fatah hawks want Jews driven out of the West Bank and ultimately into the sea.⁶⁶

The main reason the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has remained so intractable for so long is that both sides regard the communal competition in classically *zero sum* terms. Each sees the land in question as rightfully "theirs," any prospective gain for the Arabs coming directly from a loss to the Jews. Hence Jewish settlers have vowed to defend their homes and families at all costs. After a settler was killed in El Bireh, the West Bank, last December, the response of the Jews was explosive. Angry settlers blocked traffic and

⁶⁶See William Safire, "Peacemaking After Hebron," *New York Times* 2 Feb. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A11.

stoned Arab's cars on two highways in the West Bank and Gaza and warned reporters of impending doom if the government enacted its plan to arm Arab policemen in the regions as a provision of the agreement on Palestinian self-rule. As Pinas Wallerstein, leader of the settlers around El Bireh, argued to *New York Times* reporter Joel Greenberg, "Don't give them guns, because they'll be used to slaughter us. Today's incident will be a minor episode compared to the massacre that will take place here."⁶⁷ Aharon Domb, spokesman for the Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, similarly warned "Any armed Arab policeman is a terrorist as far as we're concerned, and if we run into him on a highway, I'll open fire."⁶⁸

Palestinians, by contrast, see the frequently violent reactions of the Israeli Army and random attacks by Jewish settlers, such as the recent Hebron massacre, as clear campaigns of extermination waged by Jews in an effort to drive Arabs permanently from the contested territories. Palestinians at a recent ceremony mourning the victims of the Hebron attack issued militant invectives promising retribution. Sheik Taysir Bayud al-Tamimi, the chief Muslim judge of Hebron, invoked a historical legacy of atrocities in his calls for action:

The Crusaders killed 70,000 Muslims, but it wasn't as terrible as this. There has never been such a crime. We must fight to liberate our country. The peace negotiations must stop.⁶⁹

Other Palestinian mourners issued still graver threats, with one sign reading "We will kill every last Jew until not a single one of them remains on the face of our land," and another which read "God bless those who are martyred resisting the Jews."⁷⁰ Although these

⁶⁷See Joel Greenberg, "After Palestinians Kill Israeli, Settlers' Response Is Violent," *New York Times* 2 Dec. 1993, nat'l. ed.: A8.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹See Joel Greenberg, "Hebron Mourners Predict Bloodshed," *New York Times* 2 Mar. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A4.

⁷⁰Ibid.

statements followed in the wake of an unusually severe incident of violence, they express sentiments held by substantial sectors of the population on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such zero sum perceptions promise not only to thwart higher level negotiations between the PLO and the Israeli government, but will also ensure that the volatile conflict remains continually primed for flashes of random, brutal violence such as the incident in Hebron.

2. The Sudan

The seemingly endless civil war in Sudan reveals yet another face of zero sum communal conflict. There the battle is not for homelands, but rather for physical, religious and cultural survival of the southern Christian and animist tribes. The northern Arab Islamic government in Khartoum has, for the past ten years, been engaged in an especially brutal ongoing campaign to extend Islam throughout the country.

Sudan's supreme leader is intent upon eradicating all vestiges of Christianity and animism, thereby creating a mono-cultural state in sync with the Islamic theocracy in Khartoum. This absolute objective has been pursued directly by Sudanese military campaigns against the southern rebel forces; and indirectly by sponsoring proxy warfare between Arab and Christian tribes in the south, and by intentionally blocking international efforts to mitigate the massive starvation problem which Khartoum has encouraged throughout the southern regions. As *New York Times* reporter Donatella Lorch recently observed, "More than two million Sudanese are at risk as a severe drought and new fighting in the southern part of the country threaten the worst famine in the Sudan since 1988, when about 280,000 people died." This is a potential disaster dwarfing the 300,000 Somali deaths which precipitated United Nations intervention.⁷¹

⁷¹See Donatella Lorch, "Drought and Fighting Imperil 2 Million in Sudan," *New York Times* 10 Feb. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A3.

Clearly, for the non-Islamic people of the southern Sudan, the war is a battle for cultural survival. Because of the government's strategic campaigns to foster the South's starvation dilemma, however, the war is also a zero sum battle for physical existence. Recent comments by the current U.S. Ambassador to the Sudan, Donald Petterson, reveal a somewhat limited recognition of the absolute nature of objectives at stake. Ambassador Petterson has emerged as an equal critic of both government and rebels, stating "Neither side has shown readiness for fundamental compromises to make a settlement. It takes two to tango and they haven't even gotten on the ballroom floor."⁷² The problem with the Ambassador's over-simplification is that it ignores a subtle, yet fundamental difference between the two parties' situations: the Islamic government seemingly will not compromise in its singular goal to create a homogenous Islamic state; but, because the objectives for which the southern tribes fight are zero sum in the most absolute sense, they cannot compromise. Hence the war in Sudan continues to rage, and will likely do long into the future.

3. Iraq

Like Sudan, the situation in Iraq involves the determined attempts by a Sunni Muslim dictatorship to use its military forces indiscriminately to eradicate the country's "troublesome" ethnic and religious minorities. The objective at stake both for the beleaguered Kurds in Iraq's northern border regions and for the country's Shiite Muslims of the southern marshes is, quite literally, survival. Saddam Hussein has, in the past, used all available military means in the quest to destroy Kurdish resistance forces in the north, including indiscriminate chemical warfare attacks against many Kurdish villages.⁷³ The offensive against the Kurds having been temporarily thwarted by the UN protectorate, the

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³See Graham E. Fuller, "The Fate of the Kurds," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 2 (Spring 1993): 108-121.

Iraqi government has turned instead to the eradication of its troublesome Shiite population in the country's 6,000 square mile southern marsh region.

Hussein's forces are presently engaged in a renewed program of what might best be termed *environmental genocide* to sever the rebels' lifeline to the southern marshes. By damming and redirecting water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, the region's two main feeders, the Sunni government has succeeded in drying up more than half the vast wetlands and pushing thousands of people deeper into the marshes and into Iran.⁷⁴ Rebel officials estimate that 50,000 Shiites have been killed since the uprisings following the Gulf War, and at least a third of the southern region's 200,000 residents have recently fled their homelands in the marshes.⁷⁵ The campaign of eradication has also included chemical weapons attacks against Shiite villages as well as widespread poisoning of the standing bodies of water remaining in the region. Thus through the combination of direct military attacks and indirect deprivation, Hussein's Sun forces are systematically waging a zero sum strategy of extermination and expulsion against the southern Shiites. The campaign is decimating the ancient culture of the marsh Arabs, known as the Maadan, which stretches back 5,000 years.⁷⁶

Iraq's Kurdish and Shiite populations are without the military means to raise serious opposition to the Iraqi government forces, and yet their futile struggles continue. This is because the objectives at stake are basic cultural and physical survival, and defeat is widely perceived to equal death. No party in any conflict is likely submit under such conditions, but rather will likely resist to the last man. The Kurds and Shiites of Iraq are engaged in zero sum battles for *existence*, an objective over which it is simply not possible

⁷⁴See Chris Hedges, "In a Remote Southern Marsh, Iraq Is Strangling the Shiites," *New York Times* 16 Nov. 1993, nat'l. ed.: A1.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., A4.

to bargain. In such cases, the claim that fighting is a "means to an end" loses all meaning. Rather, merely to *continue* becomes an end in itself.

4. Somalia

The communal crisis in Somalia--past, present, and future--is a situation with which, via the humanitarian media blitz in 1992 and a subsequent costly military experience, America has become painfully familiar. For this reason we will not dwell long here providing background to the conflict. It is relevant, however, to illustrate an aspect of the objective-lens (and of zero sum/non-zero sum perceptions) that differs from that applied to the cases discussed earlier.

Somalia descended into chaos in the wake of a particularly severe drought in 1990, which precipitated rampant crop failure throughout the country. As the death toll from starvation began to mount, international aid agencies poured into the country hoping to mitigate famine. Civil war erupted as the country's most powerful clan, led by General Mohammed Farah Aidid, sought *absolute political power* over the country. With inter-clan warfare expanding, agricultural production suffered further interruptions thus exacerbating the growing famine situation.

Aidid's clan enjoyed military success and began quickly to monopolize limited aid resources by force, thereby leaving the remaining Somalis to starve. In an effort to establish national political and military hegemony, Aidid and his fellow clansmen effectively halted subsistence aid to the rest of the country. The synergism between war and famine was devastating to Somalia, and created a unique version of violent zero sum competition on two fronts.

Aidid's personal quest for absolute power created a zero sum political contest in which either he would become "king" or the country would disintegrate. Inter-militia warfare shattered the Somalia's means of agricultural subsistence and Aidid monopolized

the international community's aid resources, thereby imposing a zero sum battle for existence upon the weaker rival clans. In the vicious zero sum cycle of escalation typical of violent communal conflict in the Third World, civil war exacerbated famine, even as a decreasing food supply pushed the stakes of losing on the battlefield ever higher.

The analytically interesting aspect of the Somali case is that, by unfortunate coincidence, one zero sum contest created another. Aidid's refusal to accept a power sharing coalition with other clan leaders--perhaps as "first among equals"--produced a zero sum campaign for an *indivisible* objective: absolute political power. This zero sum power struggle erupted in rampant militia warfare which halted agricultural production and interrupted relief supplies, thereby creating the second zero sum contest: a starvation induced struggle for survival. Zero sum perceptions thus exist on all sides of Somalia's civil war, but the subjective interpretations of the objective at stake--ergo *constructions of reality*--differ greatly between Aidid's faction and the lesser clans. Aidid perceives the battle as a winner-take-all grab for political power. To the rest of the country, however, the struggle is to survive.

Aidid's offensive was interrupted briefly by the arrival of UN military peacekeepers late in 1992. From the outset, however, UN strategists--including the U.S. Central Command--misinterpreted the *absolute* nature of the conflict. By regarding the war merely as the product of uncoordinated inter-tribal warfare, inspired primarily by the prevailing subsistence crisis, the UN constructed its strategy for mediation on the basis of a seriously flawed assumption. UN planners assumed that a coalition peace-keeping force would play the role as impartial referee, standing between the combatants--arms outstretched in either direction--permitting relief agency personnel to scurry about distributing needed foodstuffs. With famine mitigated--*the cause of war thus removed*--it was thought that the clans would come quickly to a power-sharing arrangement and go straight to the business of rebuilding the country's agricultural base.

Looking through the objective-lens, it becomes clear that the UN's most critical mistake came even before the relief campaign, dubbed Provide Comfort, had begun. Strategists failed to recognize early that Aidid and his faction, the "Somali National Alliance," regarded the objective in question as essentially *indivisible*, hence, non-negotiable. By focusing exclusively on the zero sum struggle against starvation, the UN unwittingly set about treating a mere symptom of Somalia's communal illness rather than attacking the disease itself. It underestimated the value which General Aidid placed on establishing and maintaining an absolute monopoly over the political and military power in Somalia.

Upon entry of the UN force into Somalia, however, General Aidid revealed to all his interpretation of the contest. Rather than join in a collective effort to establish governmental and agricultural stability, Aidid launched a guerrilla campaign directed against the mediators who would deprive him his kingdom. The UN coalition was slow to identify a change in the complexion of conflict and its eventual reaction was haphazard.

Though it ultimately became clear that Aidid would have to be deposed forcibly before a modicum of peace might be secured, neither adequate equipment inventories nor appropriate strategies were in place to conduct effective counter-guerrilla warfare. Moreover, it was far from clear that the enthusiasm which UN member-states displayed for a humanitarian relief effort would translate to the prosecution of a potentially messy counter-insurgent campaign.

In short order, cracks began to appear in the UN coalition. In the face of significant public and congressional outcry over the deaths of American soldiers in Mogadishu, the Clinton Administration elected to extricate itself from the communal morass and declare victory. With its military engine gone, the UN coalition became irrelevant.

Already, only weeks after the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, random attacks and robberies of relief agencies have begun to proliferate rapidly and serious fighting has erupted between clans in the southern port city of Kismayu. Many relief agencies are reducing their operations.⁷⁷ General Aidid, having apparently faced down the world's greatest power, is now stronger than ever before. Furthermore, the harsh reality of limited resources of subsistence precludes all meaningful compromise between the lesser clans as they scramble to survive. Lieutenant Colonel Raoul Archambault, executive officer of the U.S. Falcon Brigade preparing to leave Somalia, recently commented on the dubious achievements of America's military venture:

We somehow managed to elevate Aidid, Morgan and Jess [leaders of the country's three dominant clans] from the level of criminals to the level of statesmen. We're dealing with a group of gangsters, if you want; the bottom line is that they're thugs. It's comparable to taking gang leaders in L.A. and Chicago and making them Congressmen. It wouldn't surprise me if you had total anarchy here before Christmas.⁷⁸

Indeed, as General Aidid once again begins his grab for power and relief supplies continue to dwindle, the frantic zero sum struggle for survival will likely send Somalia back into its previous downward spiral into starvation and anarchy.

F. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE OBJECTIVE-LENS

The objectives which motivate violent communal conflicts generally differ, significantly, from those upon which the majority of the world's instrumental wars of politics are based. Since the latter class of conflict comprises the sum total of the wars in America's experience, policy makers must move beyond the existing paradigms for

⁷⁷See Donatella Lorch, "As U.S. Exits, Somali Clan Chief Stands Strong," *New York Times* 2 Mar. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A4.

⁷⁸See Donatella Lorch, "American Troops Count Hours to End of Mission in Somalia," *New York Times* 28 Feb. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A3.

analysis when seeking to identify the underlying causes of the world's present intra-state communal conflicts. Most frequently, these conflicts are characterized by the perception--held strongly by at least one of the parties in contest--of the conflict as a zero sum struggle for survival. At the very least, the objectives in question are perceived as indivisible, with "winner-take-all" as the battle cry of each contestant. This reality yields policy implications for mediation that differ significantly--indeed almost incomparably--from those associated with instrumental competitions for limited, negotiable political ends.

The specific examples discussed in this chapter are but a few of many available cases with which to illustrate the significance of zero sum objectives in violent communal conflicts across the globe. One might well apply the "objective-lens" introduced here to the Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle in Nagorno-Karabakh, to the inter-tribal warfare in Afghanistan, to the ongoing Hindu-Muslim battles in India's Kashmir and Bombay regions, or to the communal savagery in Liberia, the Caucasus, and Sri Lanka, to no less effect. The fundamental realization which such analysis yields is that the motives driving violent communal conflicts are predominantly zero sum in nature, indivisible objectives perceived to relate directly to the physical and/or cultural survival of the groups in question.

Perhaps the most serious problem posed by zero sum objectives is that they are coming to characterize more, not less, of the world's conflicts. Because land and other natural resources are declining and the world's population is growing, zero sum conflict promises to be a growth industry well into the next century. As Robert Kaplan recently observed, "In addition to engendering tribal strife, scarcer resources will place a great strain on many peoples who never had much of a democratic or institutional tradition to begin with. Over the next fifty years the earth's population will soar from 5.5 billion to more than nine billion." He concludes that "the developing world environmental stress will present people with a choice that is increasingly among: totalitarianism (as in Iraq),

fascist-tending mini-states (as is Serb-held Bosnia), and road-warrior cultures (as in Somalia)."⁷⁹

As a final point, no analysis of the perceived *objectives* in a given conflict would be complete without having previously addressed the role of *socially constructed reality* as the foundation upon which group perceptions are themselves built. As demonstrated in Chapter II, an external observer's interpretation of the objectives at stake in a given conflict, will likely differ greatly from those held by the contestants within it. Even within the same conflict, objectives may be regarded quite differently between the combatants. For the Iraqi government to claim, for instance, that its diversion of the Tigris River is intended merely to reclaim lost wetlands in a neighboring region [as, indeed, it has] is of little importance to the Shiites, who are certain beyond the slightest doubt that the measure is specifically designed to kill them. The most important lesson to recall when peering through the objective-lens is not how we--the outside world--regard the objectives in communal conflict, but rather what they--the combatants within it--perceive the stakes to be.

⁷⁹This extremely bleak, but provoking assessment characterizes the future for much of the world as a pending struggle for survival. See Robert D. Kaplan "Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 273, no. 2 (Feb. 1994): 59.

IV. THE FORCE STRUCTURE-LENS

As discussed in the preceding chapters, communal conflict manifests several unique characteristics which, in combination, account for its exceptionally violent, intractable nature as well as the strong tendency to escalate toward "total war." This chapter focuses on the last of the three characteristics, examining the role of *incoherent force structure* as a major catalyst to escalation and a guarantor of intractability in communal conflicts.

Partly because of the ready historical "resource pools" and emotion laden issues, communal disputes are prone toward violent escalation. One reason for this, as explained earlier, is that the objectives tend to be perceived as inextricably linked to cultural survival, if not to the immediate physical survival of the nation. Communal conflicts resemble neither expressions of mundane political wrangling between trade blocks, nor competitions for ideological/geopolitical influence abroad. They are, ostensibly, rooted in deeper stuff--defense of homeland, preservation of history, salvation of posterity--issues that touch the most sensitive nerves of individual and group identity.

When such roots are combined with historically perpetuated prejudice and politically activated inter-group antagonisms, the volatile tinder of human passion seemingly begs for ignition. Indiscriminate violence, whose emergence under incoherent force structures is almost inevitable, often serves as the match which lights the fires of escalation.

A. COHERENT VERSUS INCOHERENT FORCE STRUCTURE

The term *coherent force* is used here to represent a civil-military structure in which the government, military, and populace of a warring party act in approximate concert.⁸⁰

⁸⁰Some of the ideas within this section build upon the concept of *Trinitarian Warfare* as discussed by Martin Van Creveld in his provocative critique of Clausewitzian doctrine entitled *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991.)

This notion implies that a belligerent's forces under arms manifest a modicum of coordination, a common purpose, and a roughly coherent chain of command. In such a force, operational units are bound by constraints imposed by higher authority, with objectives articulated and means assigned to achieve them. Within such a framework there exists a confluence of strategy and action flowing downward from the supreme command authority to soldiers in the field. A government manifesting such a civil-military structure may be considered, in short, a *coherent actor*.

Incoherent force, by contrast, represents a structure in which a government's command authority and its armed forces are disconnected from one another for want of a functioning chain of command.⁸¹ Such a situation essentially describes a state in which the objectives of government, military and populace are uncoordinated, with each entity acting independently of the others as its local leader deems fit. Incoherent force structures are endemic in violent communal conflict, especially in untempered inter-ethnic militia warfare.

Incoherent force structure is the essential precondition for fragmented military and paramilitary violence which emerges quickly and builds rapidly in communal conflagrations and, once present, changes fundamentally the complexion of the conflict and the prognosis for resolution.

B. THE CONFLICT MATRIX

By combining two of the defining criteria introduced thus far--the *zero sum/non-zero sum objectives* in conflict and *coherent/incoherent force structure*--a useful matrix

⁸¹The phrase "armed forces" will refer throughout this chapter to the various groups within a given communal conflict which, literally, possess and employ weaponry and violence in the course of their intra-communal activities. The term may also apply, but is not limited solely, to those coherent "national military forces" resembling the United States Armed Forces. Here it will primarily refer to "those with the guns."

emerges with which to simplify and categorize four fundamentally distinct potential configurations of communal conflict. These analytic distinctions help to illuminate basic, yet essential differences between conflicts from which then to proceed with further investigation. As indicated in Figure 1, the dimensions of violent conflict may be characterized as: (A) non-zero sum with coherent force structure; (B) non-zero sum with incoherent force structure; (C) zero sum with coherent force structure; and (D) zero sum with incoherent force structure. The ability of external powers to precipitate an end to conflict diminishes, correspondingly, as one moves from category A through category D.

		<u>FORCE STRUCTURE</u>	
		Coherent	Incoherent
<u>PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT</u>	Non-zero sum	A	B
	Zero sum	C	D

Figure 1: The Conflict Matrix

Each of the aforementioned combinations represents a unique picture of violent conflict. Placing a given war into one of the four categories moves the analyst a large step forward in the process of comprehending its unique dynamics and toward deducing a set of policy prescriptions for mediation that flow from such understanding.

C. CAUSE, PROCESS, AND EFFECTS OF INCOHERENT FORCE

A comprehensive understanding of incoherent force is important not only because it is a potential catalyst in existing conflicts, but perhaps more importantly, because the onset of paramilitary violence provides a major warning sign in the life cycle of any nascent ethnic or religious dispute.⁸² Indeed, the onset of paramilitary violence may be the final opportunity for proactive mediation on the part of external powers.

For the sake of simplification, it is best to disaggregate the main components of incoherent force and view them as a series of mutually reinforcing vectors, each pulling in the direction of escalation. This task may be accomplished by examining the *cause*, *process*, and *results* of incoherent force structure, as well some of the pernicious side effects that tend to accompany civil-military fragmentation.

1. Cause: Political Manipulation of Communal Passion

Although several factors may contribute to the fragmentation of a government's martial forces, political manipulation of group insecurity is by far the most powerful. Ethnic, religious or sub-ethnic cleavages often lie relatively dormant for long spans of time, the "ancient antagonisms" between communal groups set aside in favor of peaceable rural citizenship and fruitful communal lifestyle. Once seized upon by ruthless

⁸²The term paramilitary will be used somewhat loosely throughout this chapter to describe an armed group of individuals--former or current military personnel, civilians, reserve militiamen, or any combination thereof--which operates independently of a conventional chain of command emanating from either an official state police apparatus or military organization. It will be used interchangeably with the term *militia*, to connote regional and sub-regional security collectives composed of armed individuals residing in the local areas.

political pragmatists seeking personal power, however, long dormant divisions may be manipulated in such a way as to unleash inter-group hatred of unbridled ferocity.⁸³

The current global landscape of political violence is littered with the corpses of clansmen that answered the calls of wily communicators who entertained ideas of personal grandeur. Among the current examples of politically inspired hatred is the wreckage of Bosnia, a republic of the former Yugoslavia, that until recently enjoyed proud billing as the multicultural model for the world. The strategies of Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Kardazic, Mate Boban and the rest of Yugoslavia's ardent "nationalist" politicians involved the manipulation of communal insecurities to maintain tentative positions of local authority and political power.⁸⁴ By encouraging a fragmentation of armed force from the "national" military force of Bosnia into sub-national ethnic militias composed of Croats, Serbs and Muslims respectively, each of the regions' factional leaders endeavored to secure their own positions vis-à-vis the competition.

A question that quickly arises, however, is how this thorough fragmentation was accomplished in such a short period of time, and why individual Bosnians--civilians and soldiers alike--so quickly rushed to join a side in the bloody brawl.

⁸³The manipulation of latent ethnic identity as a tool to *reconstruct reality* for political gain is one of the concepts explored extensively by Cynthia Enloe in *Ethnic Soldiers* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980). Regarding even long-dormant communal divisions, Enloe writes "The outside observer should not mistake low saliency for the disappearance of ethnic consciousness altogether. The unmobilized ethnic group is an ethnic group in hibernation. *If conditions pose opportunities or threats for which ethnic ties are germane, ethnicity may once again take on vitality and political significance.*" (Emphasis added, 6.)

⁸⁴This is among the key themes emphasized repeatedly by Misha Glenny throughout his book *The Fall*.

a. *"Reduction of Enemies" Principle*

The answer to this enormously important question may be found in a phenomenon--common to all communal conflicts--which might be called the *reduction of enemies principle*. This concept represents the choice that individuals residing within an area of nascent communal strife are quickly forced to make once politicians begin to manipulate ethnic or religious tensions for political gain. As inter-group prejudices are increasingly fostered by vigorous publicity campaigns and political propaganda, latent mistrust becomes reactivated among members of each of the various ethnic factions. Under such circumstances, there is a natural tendency--perhaps a self-defense mechanism rooted deep in human nature--to seek security amongst those who define themselves as being "alike," that is, *to group*. Politicians seeking to increase power prey upon this human instinct, loading blame for all of life's evils upon members of the other groups, the "them" groups that have caused eternal problems for the "us" group with whom the politician hopes to affiliate support.⁸⁵ With politicians from each side working simultaneously to sequester their constituencies into psychological security collectives, the society assumes a fragmentary dynamic. This dynamic causes the once heterogeneous social body to become increasingly polarized, each sect drawing inexorably away from the "others" with whom it once peacefully coexisted.

As polarization ensues, the institutional mechanisms for maintaining order and justice begin to disintegrate. This happens because institutions, being ultimately

⁸⁵Perhaps the most significant contribution to my understanding of the basic dynamics of individual and group identity have come from Harold Isaacs, *Idols of the Tribe* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975). Amongst a great many other crucial concepts relating to communal conflict, Isaacs discusses the elemental significance of the "us" versus "them" dichotomy in providing the basic grounding upon which all identity based disputes are predicated. See also, Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1 (1973): 3.

composed of individuals, themselves become casualties of the accelerating social fragmentation. Members of local governments, regional military detachments, police forces, even the media, begin to withdraw toward their own individual communal security nets. A policeman, for instance, may become less willing to arrest or investigate members of his own ethnic group accused of perpetrating crimes against the opposing group within an increasingly polarized community.⁸⁶ He may not only feel a newfound obligation to protect fellow clansmen, but may also distrust charges pressed by members of a group that becomes daily more suspect in his own mind and in the minds of those around him. Ironically, such defensive actions serve merely to reinforce the convictions entertained by the other group that the local police forces are corrupt collaborators in a creeping conspiracy of communal domination. These convictions feed the plaintiff's sense of insecurity, thereby driving him farther toward *his* own group as the only source of reliable protection available.

The spilling of blood marks a watershed on the timeline of any conflict. In communal conflict, however, violence--particularly of an indiscriminate variety--represents an escalation dynamic of herculean proportion. What might previously have appeared as a gradual process of societal polarization now accelerates rapidly. At this point, the *Reduction of Enemies principle* becomes clearly manifest. Enlightened individuals who, prior to the outbreak of violence, dismissed "nationalist" rhetoric as mere political propaganda may feel obligated to reevaluate their positions for the safety of their

⁸⁶The Israeli-Palestinian situation in Hebron is a classic example of such ethnic bias. The border police commander in Hebron recently admitted to an Israeli inquiry commission that "...all Israeli forces in the area have standing orders never to fire at Jewish settlers, even if the Jews are shooting at people." Instead, they are instructed to take cover and wait for a chance to overpower the settlers. See Joel Greenberg, "Hebron Police Chief Says Troops Cannot Shoot Jews, Even Killers," *New York Times*, 11 Mar. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A1+.

families. Those advocating the preservation of a multicultural society soon find themselves isolated between warring camps, with enemies set against them on all sides.

Such a dilemma has clearly been the case with the urban "Bosnians" of Sarajevo and other metropolitan areas of the former Yugoslavia. As the conflict there expanded, those supporting the preservation of a multicultural Bosnia found themselves confronted by three sets of enemies: Serbs, Croats and Muslims, all residents of the former Republic of Bosnia, each now declaring blood oaths against the others. As inter-ethnic violence escalated, each member of the ever decreasing pool of multicultural "Bosnians" faced a painful decision: stand unarmed against three enemies and likely die, or abandon the foundering principle of "nationhood" and join their own militarized ethnic group, thereby reducing the number of enemy camps to two and significantly increasing their chances for survival. With stakes so high, most people--like the majority of once dedicated multicultural "Bosnians"--choose the latter option. The *Reduction of Enemies principle* thus becomes reality, and represents a powerful catalyst to national disintegration.

2. Process: The Fragmentation to Militia Warfare

As institutionalized mechanisms of security fail to stem the rising tide of intermittent violence, a growing sense of individual impotence spreads throughout the community. This creates a feeling of creeping vulnerability, one that cuts across lines of class and culture, digging into the hearts of even the region's most sensible citizens. It is this mood of widespread impotence and grass-roots desperation that local political leaders seize as justification for the establishment of local paramilitary militias, ostensibly created to defend the homes and families of their communal constituents. Coincidentally, these *political* leaders become firmly entrenched as *paramilitary* chieftains of the nascent local militia forces as well.

a. *Exploiting Impotence*

Under a growing, demonstrably real threat, those individuals still outside the pale of security are forced to scurry for the cover of group protection. As communal security groups begin to coalesce, feelings of individual impotence lessen thus providing their beleaguered members with a newfound sense of empowerment and relief. Paradoxically, the move toward provincial security force organization provides an additional asset, one that represents a great leap forward along the path of escalation: offensive capability. Many people, grown weary of living "under siege," become receptive to the calls for retribution made by local leaders who sense opportunity at hand. Emboldened by militia forces at their disposal, local politicians embark on aggressive campaigns waged against neighboring communal groups. *Such campaigns may pursue provincial objectives by unsavory means and proceed largely detached from any greater strategy waged by higher national authority.*

A brief scan across the world's current ethnic and religious conflicts reveals the near universal presence of militia warfare as a common denominator. Certainly the unmitigated violence in Bosnia has been driven, in large measure, by inter-militia atrocities--each attack by one clan eliciting a still more brutal response by another.⁸⁷ Examples are equally visible in the recent pogroms perpetrated upon Muslim populations by Hindu paramilitaries in Kashmir, upon Hindu civilians by Sikh terrorists in Punjab, and in the unending battles between Christian, Muslim and Hindu militias elsewhere across India's landscape.⁸⁸ Ravenous inter-ethnic militia warfare has long been an enduring

⁸⁷For but one of innumerable articles detailing the early inter-militia atrocities in the Yugoslav conflict, see Robin Knight, "Hostages to a brutal past," *U.S. News & World Report*, 15 Feb. 1993: 56-61.

⁸⁸For a vivid account of the random violence in Kashmir, see Edward A. Gargan, "Indian Troops Blamed As Kashmir Violence Rises," *New York Times*, 18 April 1993, nat'l. ed.:

characteristic of the sub-continent's stark social cleavages. Similarly, paramilitary group violence has remained a festering communal wound throughout the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Golan Heights, where Israeli and Palestinian settlers have skirmished continually for decades. Even now, before the most promising opportunity for peace in the history of that conflict, talks may fail because they are disrupted daily by indiscriminate violence waged by opposing paramilitary militias upon civilians of each side.⁸⁹

The fragmentation to incoherent militia warfare generally results from a widespread sense of insecurity and impotence across the communal spectrum that is deftly transformed to a tool for political gain. This gain may be sought by local leaders endeavoring to reinforce or broaden their positions of power; by leaders at the national level seeking to conquer the country's other factional power holder(s) by proxy in the villages; or the conflict even may be international in scope, that is, a battle between states in which one or both opposing governments choose to manipulate communal cleavages as a strategy of warfare. Bosnia provides an example in which violent political struggles at all three levels--local, regional and international--are clearly evident.

Serbia's role as covert proctor of communal warfare in Bosnia and Croatia, by contrast, illustrates the international component of incoherent force. In an effort to expand Serbia's geographical holdings, President Slobodan Milosevic has manipulated long-standing anxieties of Serbs residing in the other Balkan republics and provided moral and material support to local Serb paramilitary units advocating

A10+. My understanding of the fragmented, incoherent nature of political terrorism in India was significantly broadened by Paul Wallace's essay, "Political Violence & Terrorism In India: The Crisis Of Identity," in *Terrorism In Context*, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park: Pennsylvania State Univ., 1994 forthcoming)..

⁸⁹The political volatility of the incoherent violence along Israel's West Bank is well illustrated in a recent report by Joel Greenberg, "After Palestinians Kill Israeli, Settlers' Response Is Violent," *New York Times*, 2 Dec. 1993, nat'l. ed.: A8.

secession.⁹⁰ His aspirations to create a territorially contiguous "Greater Serbia" have nearly been achieved with but minimal actual involvement of Serbian forces.

Regardless of the level at which political gain is expected, an essential truth of communal conflict is that individual insecurity and group identity vary in direct proportion to one another. The more vulnerable one feels about being isolated, the stronger his desire to identify with a group becomes.⁹¹ Violence, more than any other factor, reinforces this instinct. Ultimately, frightened citizens are forced to seek the physical security for their homes and families that only local political strongmen, and the armed militias they lead, can provide. Once begun, the polarization spreads rapidly. From family to family, group to group, village to city, region to state, the contested country becomes quickly atomized into a Hobbesian world in which local militia leaders rein supreme, operating by their own means in pursuit of their own objectives. It is under such conditions that one of the core qualities of all communal conflict--historically propagated misperception--blossoms to full vigor.

3. Effects: Reinforcement of Stereotypes

One need not trace the process of an ethnic or religious conflict far to discover that individual prejudice and intergroup stereotypes play enormously important roles.

⁹⁰A thorough account of the political strategies of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic during his rise to power is provided by Aleska Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer 1993): 81-96. Specifically regarding Milosevic's great talent for manipulating communal insecurities, Djilas writes, "Milosevic seems to have allied himself permanently with the politics of fear. He thrives on it and is always on the lookout for the hostility and conflict that produce it. This is one of the deeper causes of the Yugoslav civil war: *Milosevic counted on war, the ultimate condition of fear, to unite Serbs around him.*" (Emphasis added, 88.)

⁹¹See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). "In these cases, what binds a group together, separates it from others, and fatefully leads it into action is not just (and perhaps not at all) language, or religion, or skin color, but also a sense of common vulnerability...*Security is thus one major key to identity.*" (Emphasis added, x.)

They facilitate psychological and moral disengagement which prepares the communal battleground for atrocities of all kinds.

Indeed, as discussed in Chapter II, communal conflict is constructed upon a firm foundation of misperceptions, myths, and negative stereotypes, joined together as objectified reality. This psychological foundation is essential in allowing otherwise rational human beings to thoroughly vilify members of competing groups. The vilification of communal "enemies" is accomplished so comprehensively that the average citizen feels justified in perpetrating heinous brutalities against them.⁹² For a variety of reasons, incoherent force is a major facilitator both in this process, and in the perpetuation and propagation of prejudicial stereotypes.

In an environment where force structure is incoherent, violence and myth enjoy a powerful synergism, one feeding upon the other. Local militias operate largely unconstrained. Rules of engagement seldom apply where unsupervised paramilitary units are concerned. Hence--depending upon the mind set of regional or local military leaders--tactics may or may not coincide with the broadly understood and accepted international rules of war as outlined by the Geneva Conventions. Adherence to such norms frequently varies, even between different militias of the same communal group. There exists wide tactical divergence, for instance, among the *local* Serb militias in Bosnia; in Croatia; and between the *regional* Serb militias of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. The same may be said of each of the other ethnic factions in the Balkan conflict. It is essential for policy makers to realize that incoherent force structures breed tactical inconsistency, irrespective of the banner beneath which the force elements fight.

⁹²I refer once again to Albert Bandura's excellent discussion of the mechanisms by which psychological self-restraints on individual and group conduct are removed, thereby facilitating inhumane behavior, in Reich, 161-191. As Bandura observes, "Self-regulatory mechanisms do not operate unless they are activated, and there are many psychological processes by which moral reactions can be disengaged from inhumane conduct." (161.)

Almost inevitably, in a military environment absent close supervision, frequent atrocities occur. Atavistic behavior by one side becomes justification for the same on the part of the other. Stories of such digressions of humanity are touted as proof of the enemy population's barbarism, and quickly integrated into preexisting stereotypes of the other groups as sub-human monsters. In a recent edition of *World Press Review*, journalist Geert Mak offers an observation on the current ethnic bloodshed in Nagorno-Karabakh, the embattled Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan, that well might be applied across a broad swath of communal conflicts. "What drives Armenia," writes Mak, "is, as is so often the case, not a lust for conquest but wild fear." Discussing his recent trip to the beleaguered enclave, Mak continues "One evening we went to an apartment full of Armenian refugees from Baku and other parts of Azerbaijan. The room filled with visitors, all of them telling of the Azerbaijani pogroms and the death squads that roamed Sumgait and Baku in February, 1988. An old woman tells how, when she went out to buy bread, she was assaulted by young men who rubbed out cigarettes in her face."⁹³ Politicians, reporters, academics and other social propagandists find it much easier to vilify the enemy when furnished with reports, such as this, of brutalities committed seemingly at random. Indeed, the indiscriminate nature of paramilitary violence is among the most terrifying aspects of communal warfare. It is a powerful influence in perpetuating stereotypes and reinforcing zero sum perceptions of conflict.

a. A Case Study: Incoherent Force and Atrocity in the Sudan

The long running conflict in Sudan provides a still more graphic illustration of the extent to which incoherent force and concomitant inter-ethnic militia

⁹³See Geert Mak, "War and Fear Bring Isolation to Armenia," *World Press Review*, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October 1993): 11.

violence might reinforce zero sum perceptions so completely as to remove all hopes of resolution. In the latest decade-long chapter of the Sudanese civil war, the Islamic Arab government in Khartoum has waged a brutal, albeit unsuccessful, campaign intended to crush the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), the main resistance force in the south. This case is significant despite Khartoum's ultimate inability to eliminate the rebels, because the government's otherwise ineffective efforts have been significantly enhanced by the tactic of promoting an incoherent force structure and fostering inter-ethnic militia warfare throughout the south. This tactic has been a strategic boon to the northern Arab government and, simultaneously, a humanitarian disaster for the tribes of the southern Sudan.

The Khartoum government, under the leadership of General Omar Bashir, has extensively manipulated ethnic animosity between the southern tribes in its efforts to eradicate the Dinka, the SPLA's dominant tribe and its greatest source of support. Bashir has strategically armed and employed Arab tribes, traditional enemies of the Dinka, creating wandering militias of vigilantes with automatic weapons. The proliferation of weapons imported from China and Iran and the complete lack of restraints on the militias' methods have transformed ancient tribal clashes over grazing lands into wars of extinction.⁹⁴

The Dinka, with a population of roughly 2 million, are the largest single group in the Bahr El Ghazal region of southern Sudan. The region's capital city of Wau provides the logistical center for Dinka military and economic activities. Stories of government backed inter-tribal brutality in this region, bordering on outright ethnic genocide, are legion. *Cultural Survival Quarterly* chronicled a series of such attacks during a six month period in 1988:

⁹⁴See Raymond Bonner, "Letter From Sudan," *New Yorker*, July 13, 1992, 74.

March: Police near Ed Da'ein in Southern Darfur round up displaced Dinka "for protection" into railway carriages. Local army-backed Fertit militia (joined by police) kill up to 1,000 people and the rail carriages are doused in petrol and burned. Government later admitted 100 people died. Local people in and around Wau report that daily murders have been taking place for months.

June 20: Eighteen Dinkas found dead in Lokoloko area near Wau, with mutilated bodies, no heads, no genitals and a pregnant woman with a cut abdomen.

July 18: Group of Dinkas found dead in Lokoloko, again with mutilated bodies and one girl aged six or seven pierced by spear from vagina to mouth.

August 11: Responding to a "missile attack," Maj. Gen. Abu Gurun personally supervises Fertit militiamen's search of Wau area, inhabited by poor Dinka. All people without identification are shot and many houses are burned or looted. Total killed is unknown, but police report finding 89 bodies. Hundreds are brought to riverside by lorry and machine-gunned and dumped in river. Dinka boys, aged six to 10, are forced to kill their families with spears. Army puts 62 people in empty ammunition storeroom and gasses them to death with exhaust pipe connected from armored personnel carrier (witnesses report "red-lipped corpses," indicating carbon monoxide poisoning). Partial lists of missing or killed total 1,132. Gen. Gurun claims three "terrorists" killed.

Late August: Many Dinka children killed by Fertit militia. Fertit wife of a Jur (southern) man killed by Fertit militia--her eyes are put out, breasts cut off and then she is hanged. Lower ranks of the police (mainly Dinkas) form death squads [in response] to kill Fertits.⁹⁵

This partial listing of atrocities--whether objectively true or not--not only indicates the potential level of barbarity which the Sudanese conflict had reached by 1988, but also provides superb material for furthering the social construction of a zero sum reality.

As with many other cases of inter-ethnic militia warfare, the bloodshed in Sudan shows no regard whatsoever for non-combatant distinctions. Instead of reserving the violence for SPLA soldiers, the Arab militias have often turned against civilians, killing the men and attacking women and children to avenge old hatreds. The random attacks by rival tribal militias in Sudan often resemble the struggle in Yugoslavia,

⁹⁵"Sudan's Secret Slaughter," 44.

where renegade paramilitary units have wreaked similar havoc upon civilian populations caught in the middle.

The government in Khartoum has repeatedly revealed a proclivity to manipulate the indigenous inter-ethnic rivalries to augment its counterinsurgent efforts. In northern Equatoria, for instance, the Mundari tribe was implemented in 1991 by the military as a buffer force around the main town of Juba against the advancing SPLA forces. In Bahr al Ghazal and Southern Darfur, the Fertit tribe--a traditional enemy of the Dinka--has used its essentially autonomous militia forces to extract material and financial profit from the chaos.⁹⁶ It remains active in stealing the principle asset of the neighboring Dinka tribe, cattle, as well as waging war against Dinka settlements. In the Upper Nile region, the Nuer--also traditional enemies of the Dinka--were encouraged to harass the SPLA around the town of Malakal.⁹⁷ This conflict was particularly significant because of the internal strife it evoked within the SPLA itself, which until that time enjoyed significant--albeit potentially volatile--Nuer membership within the movement.

Signs of Khartoum's strategic success came in August 1991, when the SPLA underwent a major split into two opposing factions. The mainstream faction continues to be led by John Garang, and includes the larger Dinka membership. The breakaway faction, known as the Nasir group, consists of the Nuer and other non-Dinka minorities formerly included within the SPLA. The Nasir group is led by Riek Mashar, a Nuer tribesman, and includes numerous other former senior SPLA commanders.⁹⁸ The SPLA forces have subsequently engaged in bitter fratricidal warfare in which an estimated

⁹⁶"Sudan's Secret Slaughter," *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1988): 42.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*

⁹⁸See Samuel Makinda, "Security in the Horn of Africa," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 269 (Summer 1992): 46.

2,000 rebel soldiers have been killed by their former comrades.⁹⁹ This has significantly weakened the SPLA's movement vis-à-vis the government forces.¹⁰⁰

Despite Khartoum's initial impressions of success, its choice to encourage inter-ethnic militia warfare in the south seems to have backfired in the long run. Under such circumstances, the Dinka people could assume with substantial certainty that they were, indeed, engaged in a battle for survival--zero sum conflict in its purest sense. With the government directly sponsoring the enemy Fertit tribe, even truly non-aligned Dinka civilians had nowhere to turn but to the SPLA for protection.

Attacks such as those chronicled above exert enormous influence on inter-group perceptions and individual stereotypes. Facing such indiscriminate brutality, a group's collective will to resist becomes nearly unbreakable, and the means of defense which its members regard as justified become virtually unlimited. For these reasons, any conflict in which incoherent force structure either already exists or is actively encouraged is likely to be characterized by lawlessness and atrocity, and be highly resistant to external efforts at mediation.

4. Coincident Effects: The Thug Factor

A final characteristic of conflicts executed under incoherent force structures is that of the rise of common outlaws to positions of leadership amongst the paramilitary forces. This development often results in groups on each side pursuing criminal agendas under the justification of regional security, and plundering the persons and property of innocent civilians as supposed "retribution" for previous attacks by opposing militias.

⁹⁹See Chris Hedges, "Sudan's Strife Promises to Outlive Rebellion," *New York Times*, 19 July 1992, nat'l ed.: E3.

¹⁰⁰A full account of strategic and political developments subsequent to the split is provided by Mark Huband, "While The People Starve," *Africa Report*, May-June, 1993: 36.

Frequently, local criminal violence is the direct product of preexisting animosity; that is, it is perpetrated upon victims whom the attackers have long known and resented.

A senior intelligence officer of the Central Intelligence Agency recently stated, "the evidence coming out of these places overwhelmingly confirms that there is a heavy influence of *personality* in this type of (communal) violence--that is to say, the hatred is *personal*."¹⁰¹ Speaking specifically in regard to the atrocities occurring in Bosnia, he cited the basic presence of class warfare as a significant factor, "it's sort of a case of wealthy Muslim *haves* being hit by the *have not's* who are anxious to get even."¹⁰² This phenomenon has the undesirable effect of reinforcing inter-group stereotypes and spawning an environment of lawlessness which must be first removed--a difficult task--before efforts at resolution have even the most remote chances of success.

The thug factor is a toxic byproduct of the incoherent force equation, one which simultaneously increases the intensity of a conflict while decreasing the ability of outside actors to control it. It works in two important ways. First, the presence of criminals in local militia hierarchies accentuates inter-group stereotypes and reinforces the resolve of each side to resist the other. Second, granting legitimacy to former outlaws encourages them to continue fighting, thereby increasing the difficulty of bringing the armed parties to the bargaining table. This development effectively halts mediators in their tracks for, as has been proven many times in the past, efforts at conflict resolution minus the cooperation of all belligerents are likely doomed to failure.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹Much of this section is based on information obtained during an interview with a senior intelligence officer working on war crimes in Bosnia for the Central Intelligence Agency. The interview was conducted at the CIA, December 20, 1993, but because of his continuing participation in covert intelligence operations in Bosnia, the subject commented on a non-attribution basis.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³For an extensive, empirical study of the various dynamics of war termination, see Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). This work is particularly valuable in illustrating the severe limitations of the prevailing "Rational

Communal conflicts as divergent as Somalia, Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and Bosnia illustrate equally well how incoherent force provides the stage on which common criminals rise to positions of social and military prominence. In these cases and many others, former social outcasts have--largely with bullets and bravado--undergone the strange transfiguration from hood to hero, emerging with newfound status they are not prone to relinquish lightly. Having achieved the leadership and autonomous control of local armed forces, these individuals frequently embark on campaigns of rape and pillage, aggressively targeting communal opponents in order to even old scores and to increase support amongst beleaguered contingents of their own ethnic or religious constituency. Meanwhile these politico-gangsters remove potential competitors and amass personal fortunes, thus cementing their positions as feudal warlords so long as war prevails. To such men, resolution of conflict represents nothing but an inevitable loss of power and, perhaps, criminal prosecution.

a. Arkan the Magnificent

No single individual exemplifies this position so dramatically as Serbia's rogue célèbre', Zeljko Raznatovic, the infamous Serb paramilitary chieftain best known by the nickname "Arkan." Raznatovic is the leader of the much dreaded "Tiger" militia, a well armed and aggressive paramilitary unit composed exclusively of ethnic Serb militiamen who follow their leader with near fanatic zeal. From a group originally comprising little more than an odd cabal of militant soccer fans, Arkan has--through an odd marriage of charisma and terror--exploited the permissive environment of incoherent

Actor" paradigm for conflict resolution--that is, war termination as a rational bargaining process--in the growing number of hostile environments characterized by incoherent communal conflict.

force in the former Yugoslavia to build a paramilitary organization of wide renown, perhaps unsurpassed in the Balkans.

Zeljko Raznatovic's infamous résumé is detailed in journalist John Kifner's recent investigation for the *New York Times*.¹⁰⁴ Kifner writes, "wanted by Interpol for murders, bank robberies and jailbreaks across Europe, he is the undisputed kingpin of a black market and racketeering underworld and a warlord whose 'Tiger' militias led the way in looting and slaughtering through Croatia as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina." Yet despite this dubious background, Arkan has emerged, in Kifner's words, "as the newest political star in the Serbian firmament in his bid for a seat in Parliament." A man whose exploits in robbery, rape and murder earned for him a prominent position on then Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger's December 1992 list of outlaws that should face UN war crimes tribunals, Raznatovic now enjoys status as a national celebrity. With the political weight of Serbian President Milosevic firmly behind him, and the moral support of Serbs both at home and abroad, Arkan's strength is not likely to fade soon.

It would be a grave mistake to discount the case of Arkan as a mere aberration of nationalistic fanaticism, for, in Serbia as in each of the other former republics of Yugoslavia--all arenas of incoherent militia warfare--Mr. Raznatovic is hardly alone. As Kifner observes, "on all sides, the brutal fighting has brought to the fore former underworld figures, among them, for example, Tuna Matilic, a commander of the Croatian forces besieging Mostar, and Juka Prazina, a Muslim whose hijacking of a United Nations-protected Yugoslav Army convoy in 1992 provided the weapons that made the initial defense of Sarajevo possible. In addition, the war has spawned a vast criminal trade--in

¹⁰⁴See John Kifner, "An Outlaw in the Balkans Is Basking in the Spotlight," *New York Times*, 23 Nov. 1993, nat'l. ed.: A1.

arms, drugs, and other smuggled goods--that often crosses religious and national lines."¹⁰⁵ The violent Yugoslav drama thus plays on, and will likely continue, choreographed by larcenous directors intent upon postponing the denouement indefinitely.

b. Thugs in Belfast

Nor should we suppose that the Balkan war is itself unique as regards the important role which *the thug factor* plays in perpetually fanning the flames of communal conflict. In Northern Ireland, as in many other ostensibly "ethno-religious" disputes manifesting incoherent force structures, the seldom discussed influence of graft and corruption amongst the leadership of rival clans is hardly insignificant. The tendency to overlook this component as an enduring motive for continued violence is among the issues addressed in Scott Anderson's book entitled, *War Zones: Voices From the World's Killing Grounds*. Although the ethnic and religious animus at work in Belfast certainly ought not be minimized as the major cause of that region's long-running conflagration, neither, as Anderson argues, should it be held so high as to eclipse all other factors.

Belfast represents yet another conflict in which an incoherent force structure facilitated the rise of rival paramilitary godfathers pursuing criminal agendas beneath banners of ethnic patriotism. In a recent article for the *New York Times* Anderson writes, "...assigning the violence of Northern Ireland to religious hatreds or mere senselessness is too easy. In fact, the militants have a very good reason for wanting to sabotage any prospect of peace, one that has less to do with flags or gods and more to do with money."¹⁰⁶ Anderson traces Northern Ireland's slide into "gangsterism" to the first big influx of British development money in the early 1980s, funds which London hoped

¹⁰⁵Ibid., A8.

¹⁰⁶Scott Anderson, "The Price of Peace in Ulster," *New York Times*, 18 Jan. 1994, nat'l. ed.: A23.

would help cool the hotbed of ethnic and religious passions. Unfortunately, as Anderson writes, "given the high stakes, it wasn't long before the hard men advanced to the next stage of crime syndication--collusion. The chieftains of the various factions, while still publicly committed to one another's annihilation, came to a series of very private understandings: recognition of one another's free-enterprise zones, joint administration of the rackets, even 'integrated' crews of Loyalists and Republicans working side by side at construction sites."¹⁰⁷ A cessation of hostilities and the British withdrawal sure to follow would now mean an end to these warlords' well established collaborative crime syndicates --Catholic and Protestant alike--as well as ending London's development funds, Northern Ireland's most important source of external revenue. Under such circumstances, the incentives for a negotiated peace amongst the factional kingpins are virtually non-existent.

c. *Perspective*

The aforementioned examples are intended merely to illustrate a few of the serious complications that the introduction of a criminal agenda adds to the already messy plate of communal conflict. Within the Hobbesian environment of incoherent force, lawlessness thrives, quickly becoming a force with which would-be mediators must first reckon before proceeding with negotiations of any significance. Finally, because of its adverse effects on inter-group stereotypes and the additional problem of bringing disparate warlords to a common bargaining table, *the thug factor* represents a major obstacle to the achievement of lasting peace in communal conflicts.

Hence it is clear that the various components of incoherent force, exercised in combination, create an environment in which a negotiated cessation of hostilities becomes, at best, problematic. Through the manipulation of communal

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

insecurities, local politicians begin a process of societal polarization that is completed by the onset of bloodshed. The resulting fragmentation to militia warfare and inevitable proliferation of random violence simultaneously enhances intergroup stereotypes, exacerbates misperceptions and removes the formerly legitimate mechanisms for restraining antisocial behavior. This demise of order creates an opening for criminality that, once present, further polarizes opposing camps and decreases the potential for cooperative negotiations toward peace.

5. Future Fertile Ground

As two final examples of the great potential for incoherent communal forces to influence the course of global conflict, one should consider the current demographics of the People's Republic of China and of the former Soviet Union. The P.R.C. presently contains fifty-six so-called National Minority peoples, numbering some ninety million persons and inhabiting more than sixty percent of its territories.¹⁰⁸ Similarly, Russia currently has troops--military and paramilitary alike--loyal to it in every republic except Azerbaijan, with some 25 million ethnic Russians residing in scattered patches "abroad." Russians further account for more than 30 percent of the population in Estonia and 34 percent in Latvia.¹⁰⁹ In each of the former Soviet republics many of these Russian citizens, once the local power holders, are today disenfranchised and beginning to organize as Moscow fails to afford them security.

D. THE CHIEF PROSPECT OF INCOHERENT FORCE: ESCALATION

The rise of incoherent force structure brings with it, as its chief prospect, escalation. The phenomenon compounds itself. First, the proliferation of incoherent force paralyzes

¹⁰⁸Moynihan, 156.

¹⁰⁹See John Lloyd, "New World Wars," *World Press Review*, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October 1993): 8.

the institutional mechanisms of order thereby removing internal controls on group conduct and introducing what might be called the "runaway train" syndrome of degenerating violence; second, incoherent force structure engenders a "war of existence" mentality in all parties to the conflict, thereby justifying all future means of resistance and prosecution. With rising fears and declining controls local militias are freed to determine the course of conflict. Unfortunately, their violent campaigns of "survival of the fittest" are contests which too frequently recognize neither international conventions for combatants, nor immunity for civilians along the path to total war.

1. The "Runaway Train" Syndrome

As people become convinced that the once legitimate institutions of order have failed, panic spreads. The conflict assumes a posture of increasing velocity and decreasing control, much as a "runaway train" on a downward track. Latent misperceptions, revived by sly politicians, lead to renewed distrust and outright fear of those outside the group. Increased fear heightens tensions and decreases communication. Such tension gives way to violence which, in turn, reinforces misperceptions and distrust, leading to yet greater tension and further violence. The absence of institutional restraints ensures that early violence will be followed by yet more violence, each episode decreasing the likelihood of de-escalation as the cycle generates its own cruel inertia of motion.

2. Creating A "War for Existence"

As the "Runaway Train" gathers steam, an ideal environment is created in which the myth of "war for existence" may be objectified--once and for all--as fact. The frequent and random nature of inter-clan violence and atrocity serves to transform images of the enemy that might once have been recognized as gross caricatures, into widely held truths. Communal opponents no longer appear to each other as they are--as individuals with hopes, dreams, and fears, composed of human flesh and blood. Rather, they become

as permanent psychological holograms of terror--etchings of all things bad and monstrous --bent upon the inexorable destruction of one's own community. These images, once secure in a group's collective psyche, are fundamentally incompatible with further reasoning or compassion. The conflict henceforth transcends debates of "right versus wrong," becoming instead revered as a fight for life. In such a fight, any and all means of warfare become justified, regardless of consequence thereafter.

E. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATION

In scanning the global spectrum of ethnic and religious disputes, one is hard pressed to find a single conflict in which the role of incoherent force is not significant. Local militias in townships of South Africa, Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and Lebanon wreak no less havoc than do their contemporaries, mentioned here, in Gaza, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh, Wau, Belfast, and Sarajevo. Yet, despite such evidence, strategies for consolidating incoherent force structures are seldom addressed as essential to conflict mediation.

The American, indeed, the Western way of diplomacy shows a distinct a preference for rational, orderly negotiations. Satisfying this preference, however, requires selecting political figureheads with whom to deal. This process too often overlooks the fact that those individuals so chosen may speak for but limited factions of a given conflict. Any bargain struck under such conditions will be ignored entirely by those not party to the negotiations. Yet, for many of the reasons outlined earlier in this paper, bringing together all parties of an incoherent conflict is difficult, if not impossible. Herein lies the mediator's paradox in environments of incoherent force: *to bargain with a quorum is hard--to bargain without one is impossible*. As the UN Under-Secretary-general For Peace-Keeping Operations, Kofi Annan, recently observed, "The levers available to the UN in

conflicts between states are just not available in these situations. What worked in dealing with states does not work against factions led by power-hungry men."¹¹⁰

Hence, a proactive policy of intervention designed to preempt such disintegration of a country's martial forces seems to offer the best opportunities for success. Owing to the widely divergent circumstances of each individual case, it is not possible to identify specific strategies of intervention suitable for all communal conflicts. It is far more useful to discuss, in somewhat abstract terms, the notion of disarming the intergroup misperceptions that underlie communal conflict. In so doing, one may hope to attack the disease of communal hatred rather than merely treating its recurring symptoms.

F. CONCLUSION

Incoherent force structure is a key characteristic of violent intra-state ethnic or religious conflict. Its appearance signals a dangerous transformation in the life cycle of any communal dispute and often represents a major catalyst in the escalation toward total war. The proliferation of armed militias constitutes a major obstacle to the negotiated cessation of hostilities in such conflicts. Western mediators attempting to effect war termination through a rational bargaining process will find little success in an environment of incoherent force that lacks *coherent actors*, that is, two to three unified "governments" which exercise *de facto* control over each of the warring sides. Hence strategies of intervention should address the internal dynamics of incoherent force and seek to *proactively preempt*, or, if not possible, to *reactively undue* such structures. Clearly, the former may be accomplished far more easily than the latter.

The role of incoherent force in communal conflict is too seldom discussed and, perhaps, too little understood by the American policy makers currently trying to make

¹¹⁰Bhaskar Menon, "A Dangerous Time For Peace-Keeper," *World Press Review*, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October 1993): 15.

policy sense out of relatively minor ethnic and religious disputes around the world. Yet with the growing specter of major communal conflagrations looming in Russia, Ukraine, and China--nuclear powers all--now is the time for adept preventative diplomacy to assist in building safeguards into the civil-military structures of these countries.

V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The preceding discussion holds significant implications for officials attempting to forge policy responses to the world's current and emerging communal conflagrations. The conceptual-lenses provided in the earlier chapters--social construction, perceived objectives, and force structure--each illuminate a different aspect of communal warfare and, simultaneously, illustrate a number of theoretical variables which bear further consideration in the future.

A. IMPLICATIONS FOR MEDIATORS

This paper's sociological and structural analysis yields a number of significant implications for policy makers contemplating mediation in foreign communal conflicts. The *force structure* variable is perhaps of the most immediate significance to prospective strategists of intervention. This is true because the incoherent structure of the forces engaged in intra-state communal warfare requires a fundamentally different approach for mediation than that appropriate for the implicitly coherent force structures manifest in inter-state conflicts.

1. Force Structure Revisited

When seeking to influence an actor with a coherent force structure, such as most of the world's sovereign *states*, the strategy of intervention flows from the top downward. That is, to influence the behavior of the state as a whole, its government provides the logical point of contact. An agreement with the political leadership of such an actor will effect the agreed upon changes in the behavior of its forces.

When seeking to influence the disparate national actors in an incoherent force structure, by contrast, the approach differs significantly. Because of the lack of collective

leadership, a top downward strategy will not be effective. Rather, an approach from the bottom upward designed to sever ties between local leaders and their constituents, offers the most fruitful approach to mediation.

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the different force structures and corresponding approaches:




Figure 2: Force Structure and Mediation

This model was developed in collaboration with Thesis Advisor Dana P. Eyre, December, 1993

The basic strategy of intervention should thus vary according to which of the conceptual representations a conflict most closely resembles. The variable of force structure is among the most basic yet significant implications for policy makers to consider in communal conflict.

2. Time And Other Intangibles

In addition to force structure there are other, perhaps less tangible implications which are of no less significance to U.S. foreign policy efforts.

First, and perhaps most importantly, U.S. policy makers should rigorously attempt to heed the *Physician's Maxim*: do no harm. Only thorough, well-reasoned analysis--in advance of policy experimentation--offers a reasonable prognosis for achieving this goal. Based upon Washington's recent record, it is clear that the existing framework for such analysis is incomplete and should be reevaluated.

Second, U.S. policy makers should consider the potential effects of *time* in the communal conflict equation. There is an important temporal aspect to the calculus of escalation that characterizes these conflicts. A communal spat caught early in its life-cycle will seldom have reached the heights of zero sum escalation that occur as time passes and internecine violence grows.

In formulating responses to emerging conflicts, it is important to recognize that the passage of time generally complicates rather than mitigates the complex internal dynamics of communal conflicts. The characteristics discussed throughout this paper enjoy a synergistic relationship which pulls inexorably toward violent escalation as time elapses. Hence would-be peace makers must weigh the moderate expenses required for timely, proactive mediation in nascent communal conflicts against the far greater cost in "blood and treasure" that may be demanded for later intervention into an environment of advanced communal warfare.

a. *The Paradox of Humpty Dumpty*

The trade-off between the costs of proactive and reactive mediation is, perhaps, best illustrated by the well-known *Paradox of Humpty Dumpty*.¹¹¹ The story shows well the potential value of proactive mediation.

Although the story of Humpty Dumpty's great fall is an oft told fable, few raconteurs stop to consider the chain of events leading up to the catastrophe. In all likelihood, Humpty-Dumpty did not simply hop off the edge, but rather lost his balance slowly. Being a round sort of fellow, his undulations and pleas for help would have doubtless drawn the attention of at least some of the king's horses and men. Being somewhat preoccupied with their own activities, however, the horses likely chose to ignore his plight. Some of the men standing by must have wondered aloud that, surely, he would steady himself. Perhaps others worried of becoming casualties to his fall should they arrive at the base of the wall too late, and, so fearing, simply watched. A few doubtless argued, vociferously, that it was not their affair and turned away, refusing to look. There may even have been some cruel hearted cynics who shouted taunts that, were he more svelte, he might extricate himself more easily from the precarious perch.

Thus, prior to Humpty Dumpty's great fall in the story, one easily envisions a crowd of horses and men prevaricating as the hapless orb grew less stable. By the time he toppled over backward, it was, in fact, too late. Poor Humpty Dumpty fragmented into a hundred pieces or more, a mess which could never be reconstructed by all the horses and men in the kingdom, despite their most sincere efforts and tireless labors.

¹¹¹This useful, if comical, conceptual analogy was introduced to the author by Thesis Advisor, Dana P. Eyre.

This classic children's tale provides an obviously oversimplified but useful analogy to the value of proactive mediation. And, lest it seem too frivolous an example, one has but to look briefly upon the wreckage of Yugoslavia to see the wisdom in the fable's admonition for courage, citizenship, and a bit of foresight.

B. THE OPTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE

Policy makers gazing upon the global field of communal conflicts have essentially two options. The first pertains to conflicts which have not yet exploded into full-scale communal warfare. The second, by contrast, applies to more advanced conflagrations in which widespread inter-group violence already exists.

In nascent communal conflicts, mediators must proactively seek to halt the escalation toward zero sum communal competition and, simultaneously, derail the fragmentation to an incoherent force structure. This option requires entree, incentives, and a sociological strategy designed to disarm misperceptions and thereby deconstruct the emerging reality of conflict. It may be accomplished with a minimum of force and a surplus of diplomacy.

In advanced communal conflicts manifesting incoherent force structures and zero sum perceptions of reality, however, mediation is considerably more difficult. The field of actors must first be consolidated by a combination of incentives and force. De facto peace having been imposed, intervening forces may then turn to the structural and sociological strategies of organizing government and reconstructing society. This latter option is essentially a process of undoing feudalism, an approach similar in concept to those which successfully reunited the feudal societies of Europe and Japan.¹¹²

¹¹²The reunification process that ended feudalism in Japan and Europe offers significant implications for intervention in violent communal conflicts. This approach to communal

In either case, however, the variable of time is extremely important. It is essential for U.S. analysts to recognize that, as time elapses and casualties mount, the internal dynamic of escalation decreases the likelihood of successful mediation at an acceptable cost. Even as the American public's will to intervene increases over time in relation to the level of carnage in a given conflict, the prognosis for successful intervention worsens. At some point, the low probability of success becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; that is, the initially supportive public becomes unwilling to risk either its treasury or its soldiers on a futile enterprise. The danger inherent in extensive prevarication and diplomatic procrastination is graphically illustrated in Figure 3:




Figure 3: The Perils of Procrastination

conflict mediation, *undoing feudalism*, will provide the substantive grist of a pending Ph.D. dissertation by the same name.

Hence the variable relationship between time, escalation, and failure holds important implications for the makers of American foreign policy and their advisors.

1. Disarming Misperceptions

The proactive mechanisms available to prospective international mediators seeking to counter a country's slide toward incoherent force and escalation are essentially two-fold.

The first, and perhaps most apparent, is to halt--or at least slow--the polarization of its society. In this task, a sociological approach may prove the most useful. Mediators must seek--prior to the widespread outbreak of violence--to steal fuel from the engine of insecurity. Primarily through economic incentives and counter-propaganda campaigns, local and regional leaders advocating politics of division must be isolated, their strategies and motives clearly revealed as self-serving and dangerous. Government policies must then be encouraged to address communal grievances and attempt to rectify those inequitable conditions that most aggravate inter-group passions.¹¹³

A second variation might be considered in situations where nascent communal violence has begun to appear, but has not yet disintegrated to the point of full-scale inter-militia warfare. This approach involves the nominal introduction of UN peace keepers onto the soil of the troubled nation as a type of "referee force," thereby postponing further escalation. Once in place, the previously mentioned process of isolating militant leaders and removing intergroup misperceptions must be instituted quickly and continued

¹¹³The potentially volatile role of preferential policies--that is, those perceived to benefit one communal group at the expense of another--in igniting intergroup passions is a key theme explored by Donald Horowitz in Part Two of his path-breaking book on ethnicity in international politics, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985): 95-290. In Part Five, Horowitz examines further the implications, risks and possibilities of using preferential policies strategically to reduce ethnic conflict in divided societies.

indefinitely. Such a process may be long, difficult, and not inexpensive, but may avoid a later compulsion to involve peace keepers in outright hostilities against warring factions.

In either of these strategic variations of *disarming misperceptions*, incentives must be accompanied by a coherent strategy of psychological operations intended to break down existing animosities and remove fear.¹¹⁴ Such a strategy entails both an active counter-propaganda campaign aimed at the adult populations of the fragmented society and an educational campaign to help resocialize subsequent generations of potential combatants.

Clearly, few would disagree that a proactive strategy of maximizing influence and minimizing force is the most appealing option. Yet reality intrudes quickly onto such a pleasant scene, bringing with it some glaring questions: What of the missed opportunities? What about those conflicts already characterized by social polarization, force fragmentation and full-scale paramilitary violence? What may be done when there is, quite literally, no peace to keep? The short and pragmatic answer is, not much, for it becomes virtually impossible to disarm misperceptions in the midst of a fire-fight. War having arrived, it may be that the unpleasant option of "invading the country to save it," remains the only feasible action besides inaction.

2. Undoing Feudalism

The central dilemma of extricating a country from the internecine warfare that accompanies incoherent force structure and zero sum competition may be somewhat simplistically described as a problem of "undoing feudalism." Achieving negotiated peace involves bringing to the bargaining table a collection of newly empowered individuals who

¹¹⁴An excellent introduction to a comprehensive approach integrating economic incentives, strategic propaganda, physical security, and reeducation is provided by the *U.S. Army Psychological Operations Manual*, FM 33-1-1, Coordinating Draft, 1992.

have little incentive to bargain. Any such resolution will likely require establishing communication *between* and winning the cooperation *of* local militia leaders who, entrenched in positions of power throughout the various regions, enjoy de facto status akin to medieval lords.

Even if this enormous task is accomplished through various incentives, there remains the challenge of controlling the militias during ongoing negotiations, and ensuring their compliance with adopted resolutions. The challenge for mediators thus remains a multivariied problem of establishing communication, cooperation, and control amidst groups of individuals (who are functioning, essentially, as "extractive capitalists") and are wholly dedicated to destroying one another. Couched in such terms, intervention seems a futile task.

For many of the reasons mentioned above, the international community's continuing efforts to halt bloodshed in the Balkans, for instance, are not likely to succeed soon. In fact, as 1994 brought renewed UN sponsored negotiations to Bosnia, representatives of each of the warring parties predicted early failure. All sides have warned UN negotiators that the incoherent nature of the forces in and around Sarajevo and elsewhere make it likely that--even as negotiations proceed--small skirmishes might easily turn to major battles overnight. Largely because of this uncontrolled environment, the mediators recently concluded, "the prospects for peace have never looked worse in the entire 21 month long civil war."¹¹⁵ Similar prognoses might be given for the chances of peace in Israel, South Africa, Liberia, Somalia, and, indeed a number of the world's other communal battlegrounds.

¹¹⁵See report by Bob Lozier, *Cable News Network*, 18 January 1994.

C. CONCLUSIONS

This paper argues that modern intra-state communal warfare exhibits several unique qualities that distinguish such conflicts, significantly, from the wars in America's historical experience. It demonstrates that identifying the social constructions of reality is a central task for analysts seeking to comprehend the characteristics that define communal conflict. It explains that the objectives for which communal conflicts are waged are often perceived as indivisible, zero sum contests in the most absolute sense and thus differ, fundamentally, from those upon which many inter-state wars of politics are predicated. It illustrates the pernicious but seldom discussed effects of incoherent force structure which provide both the catalyst to escalation and an unavoidable obstacle to negotiations. It concludes that the state-based, implicitly coherent, "rational actor" paradigm for international relations is simply inadequate for the task of analyzing and describing communal conflicts which manifest no such characteristics.

The paper proposes a two-fold conceptual strategy for mediation based upon the extent to which a given conflict has escalated, and the level to which its internal force structure has fragmented toward incoherence. The proactive strategy addresses conflicts at an early stage and applies a sociological approach to *disarm* misperceptions and deconstruct conflict. The reactive strategy requires a forcibly imposed cease-fire followed by extensive sociological, economic, and psychological approaches toward *undoing* the feudal structure of fragmented communal society.

Because of the important differences between intra-state communal conflicts and the other Twentieth Century wars in which America has been involved, the dominant paradigms upon which past foreign policy was based now must be reexamined to ensure their applicability to modern realities. American and allied policy makers are slowly

realizing that distinct classes of conflict require equally distinct strategies of intervention if foreign policy efforts are to succeed.

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